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2OREWORD
ILLES DE KERCHOVE AND CHRISTIANE HÖHN1
reign terrorist fighters (FTFs) are a challenge both for the European Union (EU) and
s Member States and neighbouring countries in the Western Balkans, North Africa
d the Middle East (MENA). Many MENA countries are faced with high numbers of
Fs who travelled to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq. Tunisian FTFs, in particular,
so travelled to Libya. A number of these FTFs and their families have already
turned, while some have been killed and others remain in Syria and Iraq or have
oved to other conflict zones. Many FTF returnees pose a serious threat because of
eir combat training and experience, low threshold to violence and worldwide jihadi
tworks. Some FTFs have dual nationality (EU and MENA), which makes coopera-
on even more important.
ropean and MENA government experts discuss FTF-related challenges and
change good practices in dedicated working groups in the context of the Global
unter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) and the global anti-Daesh coalition. The EU
pports MENA countries to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2178 and
96 related to FTF with a project implemented by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime
NODC). In the context of counter-terrorism packages, the EU is providing capacity-
ilding assistance to partners such as Tunisia. Counter-terrorism dialogues and
sits are an opportunity to share good practices and lessons learnt.
e following issues are important in the context of returning FTFs and their families.2
e EU has been working on these issues internally. The EU Radicalisation Awareness
etwork (RAN) has published a manual with good practices for handling returning
Fs and their families.2
 Border security: FTFs and returning family members have to be identified at the
rders so that appropriate measures can be taken by the authorities. Hence it is key
at information on FTFs, including from the battlefield, is shared via Interpol and
at Interpol databases are checked at the external borders. The EU is supporting
rtners to strengthen the maintenance and checking of Interpol databases.
 Criminal investigations and prosecutions: Prosecutions of returning FTFs are
ten a challenge as it is difficult to collect evidence on the crimes the FTFs may have
mmitted in Syria and Iraq. Therefore, the EU is negotiating legislation on internet-
The opinions expressed in this foreword are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the
positions of the Council of the European Union.
RAN Manual. Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and their families, July 2017, https://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ran_br_a4_m10_en.pdf
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sed evidence (e-evidence) and has also stepped up efforts to support making
ttlefield information available to investigators and prosecutors. The EU criminal
gal framework, the Framework Decision on Terrorism, was updated to include FTF-
lated crimes in the implementation of UNSCR 2178.
 Returning children: Children can be both victims and a threat. Specific rehabilita-
on and support measures addressing the traumas are important. Many children
ve been born in Syria and Iraq and are very young, which may favour their rehabil-
ation and reintegration. Sometimes it is necessary to place children with extended
milies. They may also have medical needs after their stay in the conflict zone and
ere may need to be special measures for reintegration into schools. Overall, a
ilor-made response on a case-by-case basis is necessary.
 Prisons: The prisons need to provide a secure environment to detain the convicted
Fs. It is key to take measures to avoid the radicalisation of other prisoners and
anning of attacks from within the prison. Often with EU support, Member States
ve developed risk assessment methodologies for terrorist inmates. Member
ates will now face the challenge of prison leavers who have served their sentences.
curity measures that are compliant with rule of law may be necessary.
 Rehabilitation: The development of disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegra-
on programmes inside and outside prison is key and has been supported by the EU.
 is challenging to develop such programmes, but they are needed for FTFs and
mily members who can’t be prosecuted for lack of evidence and also for those who
ve been convicted but will be released after some years. It is key that MENA
untries also develop such rehabilitation programmes.
 Counter-narratives: Returning FTFs might engage in the recruitment of others,3
ven their ‘veteran’ status. Support for counter-narratives, also online, could help to
itigate this risk.
ere may be more returning FTFs and family members. It is important for MENA
untries to be prepared to handle this challenge. Overall, a whole-of-government
sponse, collaboration and information sharing among the different authorities
w enforcement, security services, judiciary, local level, social workers, psycholo-
sts, child welfare) is key. A repressive approach alone is not enough. Prevention of
dicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration are equally important. Overall,
stainable and smart counter-terrorism policies have to comply with the rule of law
d human rights, to avoid grievances, radicalisation and accusations of double
andards. The EU is ready to further support MENA countries in handling challenges
lated to the return of FTFs and their families.
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siTRODUCTION AND KEY FINDINGS: 
RANSPARENCY AND HUMILITY NEEDED
HOMAS RENARD AND SABINA WÖLKNER
e conflict in Syria and Iraq has mobilised an unprecedented number of foreign
rrorist fighters (FTFs). More than 50,000 individuals travelled to the Levant to join
adi groups. While fighters have flocked from virtually every corner of the world, a
gnificant contingent came from North Africa. This has created an unprecedented
allenge for individual countries, as well as for the broader Maghreb and Mediter-
nean regions.
e ‘Caliphate’ has now been defeated with the loss of its remaining territories.
hile many people were killed, thousands of fighters and family members are either
 detention in Syria or in Iraq – or still on the run. Authorities worldwide are contem-
ating – or should be contemplating – the possible return of these fighters in the
ort to medium term and how to deal with them. In fact, more than a thousand
orth African fighters have already returned home since 2012.
llowing this unprecedented number of jihadi volunteers, countries must now
ndle an unprecedented number of jihadi veterans who present a multi-faceted
curity and societal challenge from prosecution to detention and rehabilitation.
rguably, whether they return or not, some of these fighters are likely to have a
sting effect on the global jihadi movement and on local dynamics in their country4
 origin. As highlighted in this report, history is a reminder that even small numbers
 veteran fighters can have a significant impact on local, regional and global security.
ere has been a growing amount of research into (returning) foreign fighters
cently.1 This research was needed to better understand the phenomenon, either
 general terms or at a country-specific level. Most of this research focused on
partures rather than returns, and it focused often more on the individual dynamics
d motivations rather than on governments’ debates and responses. Yet, as most
vernments still grapple with returnees, it is important to look into governments’
sponses, with a view to opening a discussion and possibly making some recom-
endations.
 this report, we have therefore decided to focus on governments’ responses to the
sue of returning foreign fighters in North Africa, in light of the unprecedented
gional mobilisation. Tunisia, notably, has often been described as the largest
ovider of foreign fighters to the Levant, or certainly one of its top purveyors. Egypt
d Morocco have also seen a significant mobilisation for jihad, justifying their inclu-
on in our study.
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e offer a comparative analysis of the situation in these three North African
untries: Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Such an approach, using similar guidelines for
l contributing authors, allows for interesting comparisons between the circum-
ances that led to the departure of fighters and the responses to dealing with their
turn. Contributors were asked to look into domestic perceptions and debates
lated to the threat from returnees, and the specific policies developed to handle
em. They were also asked to compare current perceptions and responses with
evious jihadi mobilisations.
ur starting point was that there is a need for more data and empirical evidence to
en a discussion on this sensitive topic. It is common sense that hiding problems
es not result in solutions. However, in many countries there is a lack of transpar-
cy or even censorship that prevents evidence-based research. It is our assumption
at more transparency in this debate would lead to better-informed discussions
d, therefore, better-informed policies.
 the context of this project, the authors made their best possible attempt, given
cal constraints, to describe the scope of the challenge and the responses in place.
is comes in addition to general difficulties in gathering reliable data on foreign
hters. For these reasons, the figures provided in this report, based on different
urces available, should be taken with extreme circumspection.
yond transparency, good policy-making also involves a good dose of humility.
any governments worldwide have developed policies to deal with (returning)
reign fighters over the past few years, notably in Europe. However, all govern-
ents recognize that such policies and programmes are to be treated with caution:5
See for instance, among many others: T Hegghammer (2010), ‘The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam
and the Globalization of Jihad’, International Security, 35:3, pp. 53-94; T Hegghammer (2013) ‘Should I Stay
or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting’,
American Political Science Review, February; D Byman (2015) ’The Homecomings: What Happens When
Arab Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria Return?’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38:8, pp. 581-602; D Byman
(2019), Road Warriors: Foreign Fighters in the Armies of Jihad, Oxford: OUP; D Malet (2013), Foreign Fight-
ers: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts, Oxford: OUP; D Malet and R Hayes (2018), ‘Foreign Fighter
Returnees: An Indefinite threat?’, Terrorism and Political Violence; T Renard and R Coolsaet (2018), ‘Return-
ees: who are they, why are they (not) coming back and how should we deal with them? Assessing policies
on returning foreign terrorist fighters in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands’, Egmont Paper 101, Brus-
sels: Egmont Institute; K Cragin (2017), ‘The Challenge of Foreign Fighter Returnees’, Journal of Contempo-
rary Criminal Justice, 33:3, pp. 292-312; J de Roy van Zuijdewijn (2014), ‘The Foreign Fighters’ threat: What
History Can (not) Tell Us’, Perspectives on Terrorism, 8:5, pp. 59-73; M Hafez (2009), ‘Jihad after Iraq:
Lessons from the Arab Afghans’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:2, pp. 73-94; A Zelin (2018), Tunisian
Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria, Policy Notes 55, Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy; B
Van Ginkel and E Entenmann (2016), The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union: Profiles,
Threats and Policies, The Hague: ICCT; J Cook and G Vale (2018), ‘From Daesh to “Diaspora”: Tracing the
Women and Minors of Islamic State’, London: ICSR; Z Fellman (2018), Fallout: The future of foreign fighters,
Washington: CSIS; D Thomson (2018), The Returned: They Left to Wage Jihad, Now They’re Back, London:
Polity; R Barrett (2017), Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees, New York: The
Soufan Group; A Meleagrou-Hitchens, S Hughes and Bennett Clifford (2018), The Travelers: American Jihad-
ists in Syria and Iraq, Washington: GWU Program on Extremism. 
An extensive literature review is available here: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/
customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2018/issue-5/tinnes-2.pdf
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e effectiveness of these programmes has yet to be assessed. Everyone is still
arning by doing’, and most likely committing mistakes along the way. Further-
ore, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. It is unclear to what extent some ‘good
actices’ developed in one city or country could be duplicated in another city or
untry with similar effects. At the same time, however, broader guidelines for
aling with returnees have been identified in various foras, notably within the
nited Nations, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum or the European Union.2 Some
 these recommendations are certainly worth considering for any government,
cluding those in the Maghreb.
om a European perspective, North African dynamics are of particular interest. First,
cause instability in the region could have a damaging spillover effect for European
curity. Second, because a majority of FTFs from Europe were of North African
scent, which has strengthened ties between jihadi milieus across the Mediterra-
an that might have an equally lasting impact for security on both sides. European
terest in this issue was emphasised in the foreword by the EU Counter-Terrorism
ordinator, highlighting some of the key lessons learned from Europe, which could
 helpful to other countries.
is report is jointly edited by the Egmont Institute and the Konrad-Adenauer-
iftung. It follows a joint event organised in Brussels in May 2018. It also builds on
e previous work of our respective institutions on this specific topic and on violent
tremism more broadly. A similar report on European responses to returning FTFs
as published in this series of Egmont Papers in February 2018.3 We do hope that
ch research projects can help trigger constructive debates and inform the shaping
 better policies.6
ey findings
mong some of the key findings from this report, we highlight the following:
Countries from the Maghreb have provided one of the largest contingents of FTFs
to the Levant. More than 5,000 individuals joined jihadi groups in Syria and Iraq,
while about 2,000 went to Libya. This jihadi mobilisation is possibly larger than
any previous ones, including that for the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the
1980s.
Madrid Guiding Principles: A practical tool for Member States to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters,
UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, S/2015/939, December 2015; 2018 Addendum to the 2015 Madrid Guid-
ing Principles, UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, S/2018/1177, December 2018; Good Practices on
Addressing the Challenge of Returning Families of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), The Global Counterter-
rorism Forum (GCTF), September 2018; RAN Manual. Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and
their families, Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), July 2017.
T Renard and R Coolsaet (2018), ‘Returnees: who are they, why are they (not) coming back and how should
we deal with them? Assessing policies on returning foreign terrorist fighters in Belgium, Germany and the
Netherlands’, Egmont Paper 101, Brussels: Egmont Institute.
••
•
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While the causes of this unprecedented mobilisation are hard to disentangle, it
appears that the post-‘Arab Spring’ transition had a particularly significant impact
in the region.
Some returning foreign fighters have already been involved in attacks and other
illegal activities in the region, highlighting the threat they pose. Two of Tunisia’s
deadliest terrorist attacks were conducted by returnees.
North African countries have previously been confronted by returning foreign
fighters. They have experienced attacks, recruitment and other destabilising
activities from veteran fighters of the 1990s and early 2000s. However, while
familiar with these risks, North African countries have taken only limited meas-
ures to deal with the latest wave of (returning) foreign fighters.
Of all the countries surveyed in this report, Morocco is by far the most advanced
in dealing with returnees. It has taken legal measures as well as strengthening its
security services accordingly. It has also developed deradicalisation programmes
in prison and is working on other initiatives with former radicals. In contrast,
Tunisia and Egypt are much less transparent and systematic in their approaches.
It appears that their capacities are limited, and their approach is very narrowly
security-driven.
Overall, all Maghreb countries are still lacking a comprehensive approach for
dealing with returnees, encompassing measures from prosecution to detention,
post-penitentiary counselling and reintegration. In the absence of a comprehen-
sive and long-term approach, including ambitious prevention and inclusion
programmes, the challenge of returning fighters will soon re-emerge in a new
form, as it has done regularly since the mid-1980s.7
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2GYPT’S FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS: 
YCLES OF VIOLENCE
LLISON L MCMANUS
s efforts to combat the Islamic State (ISIS) have gained significant ground in Iraq and
ria, new policy concerns have arisen around the return of fighters to their home
untries. These ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ (FTFs) number up to 42,000 by some
nited Nations (UN) estimates,1 and hold at least 104 different nationalities.2 The
ospects of the repatriation of captured fighters, the return of fighters fleeing the
nflict or the return of those who were never able to join, raise pressing questions:
hat capacity does the state have to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by
ose returning from foreign conflicts? What capacity does the state have to prevent
imes from being committed in the future? What ethical and legal responsibilities
es a home country have related to these?
 Europe, significant financial, intellectual and practical resources exist to grapple
ith these challenges. This is not necessarily the case elsewhere: in Egypt, the
mber of fighters remains obscure, and there have been few earnest efforts to
amine and assess the state’s capacity to tackle the challenges associated with their
turn. This paper seeks to address the aforementioned questions and to determine
e implications of the return of fighters for Egypt’s national security, regional
curity and global efforts to combat extremist violence. While the Egyptian govern-
ent has, at times, acknowledged the potential threat from foreign fighters, it has8
t articulated any specific measures (legal, policing, social or otherwise) specific to
dress the threat of fighters returning from recent conflicts in Syria, Iraq or Libya;
ide from some criminal charges stemming from activity with foreign terrorist
tities and increased border security, Egyptian and international policymakers and
curity officials treat Egypt’s FTF issue through the same framework as domestic
rror threats.
UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, ‘The Challenge of Returning and
Relocating Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Research Perspectives,’ March 2018. Available at: https://
www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/CTED-Trends-Report-March-2018.pdf
A Schmid, ‘Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter Estimates: Conceptual and Data Issues,’ The Hague: International
Centre for Counter-Terrorism, October 2015. Available at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/
ICCT-Schmid-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighter-Estimates-Conceptual-and-Data-Issues-October20152.pdf
REg
pr
es
fo
Ca
bi
ti
jih
re
th
re
in
si
Eg
Tr
A
sp
Is
af
fo
in
al
af
Q
A
al
Ba
2
A
ap
vi
3
4COMPARING POLICIES ON RETURNING FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS IN EGYPT, MOROCCO AND TUNISIA
oots of Egypt’s foreign fighter problem
yptian participation in transnational jihadist movements3 is neither unique to the
esent day nor specific to ISIS. Throughout the 1980s, a wave of Egyptians,
timated in the thousands, joined the mujahideen in Afghanistan to fight Soviet
rces. Afghan mujahideen fighters also trained inside Egypt, in a programme that
iro sought to leverage with Washington to secure its now decades-old multi-
llion-dollar annual military assistance.4 The fight was characterised as a revolu-
onary and anti-imperial effort, but it constituted the roots of today’s transnational
adist movements, with Egyptians present from the very beginning, some of whom
main in pivotal roles today. ‘The Blind Sheikh’, Egyptian Omar Abdel Rahman, was
e leader of the Jama’a al-Islamiya (JI), an Egyptian terror group that would be
sponsible for some of the country’s deadliest violence; after spending three years
 prison awaiting trial for charges of having issued a fatwa leading to the 1981 assas-
nation of President Anwar Sadat, Abdel Rahman was acquitted, expelled from
ypt and fought alongside the mujahideen. He later orchestrated the 1993 World
ade Center bombing and died serving his sentence in a US federal penitentiary.
yman al-Zawahiri was a contemporary of Abdel Rahman and a member of the JI
in-off organisation responsible for Sadat’s assassination in 1981, the Egyptian
lamic Jihad (EIJ). Al-Zawahiri and other members of the EIJ spent years in prison
ter an intense crackdown in the wake of the assassination and there amassed a
llowing. Like Abdel Rahman, al-Zawahiri travelled to Afghanistan upon his release
 1984, where he met bin Laden. Having assumed leadership of the EIJ from abroad,
-Zawahiri formally merged his group with al-Qaeda in 1998 and became its leader
ter bin Laden’s death, a position that he still holds today. Indeed, much of al-
aeda’s leadership have been Egyptians who fought with the mujahideen. Egyptian9
bu Ayyab al Masri trained in Afghanistan before becoming one of the leaders of the
-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq – the precursor to ISIS under Abu Bakr al-
ghdadi.
011-2014: The Next Exodus
fter Sadat’s assassination, the presidency of Hosni Mubarak saw various
proaches to dealing with Islamists in the country, many of whom were non-
olent but were considered a political threat. The years from 1992 to 2000 saw a
For the purposes of this paper, I use transnational jihadist movements to describe groups, organisations or
networks adhering to and advocating for a Salafi-jihadi religious ideology, and which transcend state
boundaries. While there are noteworthy differences between these groups across contexts, the motiva-
tions to join, worldviews shared by, and, most especially, the glorification and politicisation of violence
among them are similar.
E Cody, ‘Egypt Says It Trains Afghan Fighters,’ Washington Post, 14 February 1980. Available at: https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/02/14/egypt-says-it-trains-afghan-rebels/a09f455a-fca0-
48c0-b7fe-12e8c9bcede6/?utm_term=.a658af51e89e
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ncerted crackdown: tens of thousands were arrested and detained, often in
ministrative detentions without charge, allowed by a state of emergency that
d been in place since 1967. In 2011, the state of emergency expired and was not
newed, a demand of the popular uprisings at the time. The expiration of the state
 emergency meant that the legal justification for keeping those held under it in
ison was removed, casting into question the legal status of those held in admin-
trative detention, and many began to be released. An investigation from
dependent Egyptian media outlet Mada Masr revealed that over 800 Islamists
ere released under the interim government and another 80 under Muslim Broth-
hood president, Mohamed Morsi.
any were non-violent Islamists or even simply in the wrong place at the wrong
me,5 but others caused far greater security concerns. In 1999, Ahmed Salama
abrouk was sentenced to 15 years in a military prison as part of a case against the
J; while incarcerated, he led a group of militants that rejected the EIJ’s calls for non-
olence in 2006. After being released from prison after 2011,6 Mabrouk travelled to
ria and joined the leadership of the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, remaining
rough its evolution to Jabhat Fatah al Sham until he was killed in a US airstrike in
16. Muhammad Jamal Abdo Al Kashef was the former operational commander of
e EIJ under Ayman Al Zawahiri and was released from prison in 2011. He then
unded and led an al-Qaeda affiliate, the eponymous Muhammad Jamal Network,
tting up training centres in Libya, training some of the militants who carried out the
12 attack on the US embassy in Benghazi that killed four Americans: Ambassador
ristopher Stevens, US foreign service officer Sean Smith and CIA operatives Glen
oherty and Tyrone Woods. Jamal eventually travelled back to Egypt where he
rmed another al-Qaeda affiliate, known as the ‘Nasr City Cell’, which was accused10
 having planned several attacks, although never actually taking action. He was
rested by Egyptian authorities in a 2012 raid.7
fter Morsi’s ousting and amid public sentiment that had turned against Islamists,
e Muslim Brotherhood was, for the first time, labelled a terrorist organisation in
ypt, and police began rounding up tens of thousands suspected of Islamist affilia-
on or support for former president Morsi, and quelled Islamist-led demonstrations
ith force. The push and pull factors of these harsher attitudes towards Islamists at
me and perceived failures of nonviolent Islamism on the one hand, and the attrac-
veness of contributing to the fight against Assad in Syria or the establishment of the
H Bahgat, ‘Who Let the Jihadis Out,’ Mada Masr, 16 February 2014. Available at: https://madamasr.com/
en/2014/02/16/feature/politics/who-let-the-jihadis-out/
It is unclear on what terms Mabrouk was released, as his sentence had not been completed.
Also present in the same neighbourhood that housed the Nasr City cell was Hisham Ashmawy, a former
Egyptian special forces officer who is suspected of masterminding some of the deadliest attacks on Egyp-
tian soil since 2011. Ashmawy initially fought alongside militants in North Sinai but left for Libya around the
time that the group pledged allegiance to ISIS. From Libya he established several jihadi training centres until
he was captured by Libyan National Army forces in Derna in October of this year. It is unknown whether or
to what degree Ashmawy was in contact with the Nasr City cell during his time there.
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aliphate’ on the other motivated Egyptians to leave the country.8 One famous
ample was the ‘hipster jihadi’, Islam Yaken, a young aspiring bodybuilder who left
e upper-middle-class Cairene neighbourhood of Heliopolis for Syria; Yaken began
 follow a conservative Salafist preacher and, after becoming disillusioned with the
litical process in 2013, decided to travel to Syria where he posted images of
vered heads and other acts of violence.9 Another young man, facing trial in a
rrorism case, revealed that he had travelled to Syria primarily due to financial
ruggles and in an attempt to get married. After speaking with friends who encour-
ed him to deepen his religiosity and travel abroad, he secured a tourist visa to
rkey, through which he entered Syria and received four weeks of military and
iritual training. Following his training, he was married to a Syrian widow and
ceived a monthly stipend of 600 dinars.10 The young man returned to Cairo less
an a year later, carrying out surveillance and other missions for the Egyptian al-
aeda-affiliated terror group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis.
hallenges to determining number of Egyptian FTFs
hile these cases are instructive in showcasing the variety of profiles, travel patterns
d threats posed, they are not comprehensive or necessarily representative of the
tal population of FTFs. Assessing the total magnitude of the FTF phenomenon is
ade difficult by unreliability of information, differences in definition and practical
d security challenges related to conducting research or investigation. While many
 these challenges are common to determining the size of foreign fighter popula-
ons,11 they are all compounded in the case of Egypt.
liable information is notoriously difficult to access in Egypt, particularly on security11
sues. The process of investigating security-related offences is shrouded in a secrecy
at is facilitated both by laws and norms: court records are not regularly made
blic, lawyers may not even know clients’ charges until well after a case is referred
 trial and the use of military tribunals (where civilians are regularly tried) further
scures information around potential FTFs in the courts. Torture and forced confes-
ons are pervasive, casting serious doubt on the reliability of information presented
 and from Egyptian government officials; a recent report from Human Rights
For more on attitudes and social factors contributing to Egyptians’ mobilisation towards Syria: Devron, J,
‘Embracing Salafi Jihadism in Egypt and Mobilizing in the Syrian Jihad,’ Middle East Critique, 25: 4, July
2016.
M El-Naggar, ‘From a Private School in Cairo to ISIS Killing Fields in Syria,’ New York Times, 19 February
2015. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/world/middleeast/from-a-private-school-in-
cairo-to-isis-killing-fields-in-syria-video.html
H Bahgat, ‘The Arab Sharkas Cell: The Quasi-Cover Military Trial of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdes,’ Mada Masr, 2
September 2014. Available at: https://madamasr.com/en/2014/09/02/feature/politics/the-arab-sharkas-
cell-the-quasi-covert-military-trial-of-ansar-beit-al-maqdes/
Schmid, 2015.
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atch described an ‘assembly line’ of torture through criminal proceedings, specifi-
lly designed to collect false information that could be used to build a case.12
 addition to difficulty in assessing credibility of information, challenges in defining
hat constitutes a ‘terrorist’ entity create obstacles to assessing the problem as well.
garding FTFs, most definitions refer to individuals’ presence in a territory for which
ey do not hold nationality and participation in terrorist activities (the definition of
hich is, of course, also contested). However, there is wide discrepancy in terms of
w these activities are defined, whether material support that does not amount to
mbat would be included, and how to deal with the matter of those (especially
omen and children) who may not have provided direct support, or who were
erced.13 The definition of terrorist entities by states is also subject to the political
ntext in which they are designated: Egypt, for instance, regards members of the
uslim Brotherhood as terrorists, at home and abroad, though its efforts to
vocate for a similar designation in the United States have largely fallen flat. Finally,
hile ISIS in Iraq and Syria has undoubtedly attracted the greatest number of FTFs,
her entities present in these and other countries have also attracted fighters, who
ay or may not be included in estimates. Indeed, by the time ISIS had established its
ip in 2014, the Syrian theatre had already become a magnet of previously unseen
oportions, with many joining Ahrar al-Sham and Nusra Front, as they were known
 the time. Additionally, Egyptians have recently carried out violence and trained
ith (or trained) armed groups throughout the Sahel, in Libya, in Gaza and elsewhere
 the region. Pinpointing figures becomes further complicated as it is unclear which
ay have relocated from other conflict sites and which represent new cases of
hters leaving Egypt.
dditionally, the ability of media, civil society or scholars to conduct credible investi-12
tions has been severely limited by the Egyptian state’s national security laws and
rms, in what many have termed a ‘crackdown’. Media gags on security issues are
gular; mobility restrictions are in place into and around North Sinai; anti-terror
gislation criminalises reporting figures other than those of the government; and
searchers and journalists are regularly imprisoned, tortured and even killed for
rrying out their work. In one example, researcher Ismail Iskanderani, who had
nducted research into security and social dynamics in North Sinai and had held a
llowship at the prestigious DC-based Wilson Center, was sentenced to 10 years in
military trial on charges related to ‘spreading false news’. His case underscores the
ohibitive considerations researchers must make in verifying government accounts
 conducting independent investigations into any security-related issue.
Human Rights Watch, ‘Egypt: Torture Epidemic May Be Crime Against Humanity,’ September 2017. Availa-
ble at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/06/egypt-torture-epidemic-may-be-crime-against-humanity
For more on the various definitions: Schmid, 2015.
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he unique position of North Sinai
ypt’s North Sinai province, geographically isolated from the mainland and
aring a border with Gaza, has seen most of the country’s militant activity over
e last decade and some of the deadliest mainland attacks have been planned
om there. According to statistics gathered by the Tahrir Institute for Middle East
licy (TIMEP), the province has been the location of 2,055 terror attacks from
10 to present day, and 991 civilians and nearly 1,200 security forces have been
ported killed in the province during that time.14 The province has been the site
 militant training facilities; fighters from North Sinai have carried out attacks on
e mainland; and it is the primary destination for Egyptians seeking to join jihadist
ovements.15 In November 2014, the formerly Al-Qaeda-affiliated Ansar Bayt al-
aqdis pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and became known
 Wilayat Sinai.16
ere is no public consensus on the number of fighters in the province, whether
yptians from the mainland, Bedouins native to North Sinai or fighters who have
avelled from Syria and Iraq. Anecdotal accounts did suggest the presence of the
tter, particularly in mid-2014 at the time of cementing allegiance to ISIS, but it is
known how many have stayed or entered since that time. While those who leave
ainland Egypt for Sinai are not counted among the country’s ‘foreign’ fighters,
yptian prosecution files suggest that many leave from Sinai to travel abroad, and
ost of the cases of violence carried out in mainland are perpetrated by fighters who
ent at least some time in Sinai. Thus, North Sinai presents many of the same
allenges for Egypt’s security policy as a foreign territory, as well as many of the
me challenges for research into the scope of the problem. North Sinai underscores
at the concept of ‘foreign fighter’ may, in some cases, not be limited to those who13
ave state territory.
ome estimates
aving established the difficulty in assessing accuracy, several figures have been put
rward on the number of Egyptian FTFs. Most open-source estimates seem to
rive from one of two sources: a 2015 report by the London-based International
ntre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) estimated 350 Egyptian FTFs, and a 2017
To reference the methodology used to collected these figures, see: The Tahrir Institute for Middle East
Policy, ‘Five Years of Egypt’s War on Terror,’ July 2018, p 54: https://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/
07/TIMEP-ESW-5yrReport-7.27.18.pdf
Bahgat, September 2014.
Wilayat Sinai is translated from Arabic as ‘Sinai Province,’ referring to its position as one of the provinces in
ISIS. The allegiance to ISIS caused a split within the group, with some members insisting on maintaining
affiliation with al-Qaeda. Some of these left the group and travelled to Libya; al-Qaeda has recently reas-
serted its presence in Egypt with resumed activity in late 2017 through its affiliates Ansar Islam and Jund al-
Islam.
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ufan Center report written by Richard Barrett estimated 600.17 No methodology is
ailable for the ICSR report. The Soufan Center report references a 2015 article in
e New Yorker magazine which cites ISIS expert and TIMEP Fellow Hassan Hassan
at ‘around six hundred Egyptians have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq’.18 The same
ures have been cited in a March 2018 UN report, a 2018 European Institute of the
editerranean report, not-for-circulation documents provided at security conven-
gs and other news media reports. Yet, when I asked Hassan about the source and
ope of this figure, he did not immediately recall.
uch higher estimates have been put forward, which appear to include those
hting with other groups in Syria. A 2013 estimate from former Egyptian Member
 Parliament Dr Mostapha Naggar estimated 2,000 fighters had travelled to Syria to
ht alongside anti-Assad forces. Dr Naggar has since been forcibly disappeared and
 thus not available to clarify his sourcing. A 2014 report from Dr Mustafa Menshawy
ted 5,000 foreign fighters, based on information from an anonymous Egyptian
vernment official, but did not clarify whether these were fighting with ISIS or other
rces, or during what time period.
ports or estimates from government officials seem to reflect the estimates from
e Soufan report. A 2015 New York Times article cites an unnamed Egyptian Interior
inistry figure of 600,19 despite the stark contrast with the anonymous official cited
 Menshawy. Consecutive reports on progress towards the UN Resolution 2178
sued after this time cited that Egypt ‘does not possess accurate information’ on the
mber of foreign fighters.20 While Egypt does monitor threats exiting and entering
e country, the legal, political and practical definition of terrorism is broad enough
 include political dissidents, members of the Muslim Brotherhood and others who
ay not be engaged in internationally recognised acts of ‘terrorism’, making the14
curacy of its figures difficult to assess. (As will be detailed later in this report, no
ecific legislation or policy exists to deal with FTFs separate from that dealing with
rrorism generally.)
S government officials independently corroborated figures from the Soufan report,
timating the number who left Egypt to fight alongside ISIS at between 500 and 600;
is figure did not include children under 12 years old or those who may have joined
R Barrett, ‘Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees,’ The Soufan Center, Octo-
ber 2017. Available at: http://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Beyond-the-Caliphate-
Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-Returnees-TSC-Report-October-2017-v3.pdf; and P. Neumann, ‘Foreign
fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s,’ The Interna-
tional Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, January 2015. Available at: https://icsr.info/2015/01/26/
foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/
P Hessler, ‘Egypt’s Failed Revolution,’ New Yorker, 2 January 2017. Available at: https://www.newyo-
rker.com/magazine/2017/01/02/egypts-failed-revolution
El-Naggar, 2015.
UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, ‘Implementation of Security
Council resolution 2178 (2014) by States affected by foreign terrorist fighters,’ September 2016. Available
at: https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/FTF-Report-1-3_English.pdf
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her opposition groups (and who may have carried out terrorist activity with them).
 meetings held in October 2018, other US State Department officials downplayed
ncerns over FTFs returning to Egypt (compared to domestic, internal terrorist
reats) and indicated that they were not actively monitoring any estimates.
e Washington Institute’s Aaron Zelin, in his report on foreign fighters in Libya,
timated the number of Egyptian FTFs in Libya at 112 from 2011 to 2017. His
dings were based on open-source information, while noting no Egyptian govern-
ent figures exist on this data as well.
gardless of the actual number of returnees, as the historical cases demonstrate,
en a very few dedicated and well-trained FTFs still pose a serious policy concern.
ey may (and have in Egypt) return to carry out attacks in the country, recruit
hters to carry out violence there or elsewhere, train or equip existing militants or
tablish new militant formations. Thus, successful mitigation of the threat is contin-
nt both on ensuring that these individuals do not continue to engage in terrorist
tivity upon returning, but also on addressing the environment in which they may
 able to join, recruit, train or inspire.
easures taken to address foreign terrorist fighters in Egypt
e Egyptian state, including various administrations and leadership of its security
rces, has often portrayed terrorism as a threat originating from outside its own
rders. In some recent instances, most notably in the case of military officer-
rned-jihadist Hisham Ashmawy, who was captured in Derna, Libya in October 2018
ter having been suspected of orchestrating some of Egypt’s deadliest terror attacks
nce 2013, cases of Egyptians having travelled abroad are raised to high levels of15
tional security. In other instances, President Abdel Fattah el Sisi and others have
blicly voiced concerns over fighters travelling across borders to enter Egypt. As
ident with the cases detailed in the next section, court records indicate the
yptian judiciary and law enforcement are aware of the threat that returning FTFs
se to the country. Despite this, very few specific laws, programmes or policies exist
 deal with the FTF issue, and very few were put in place to deal with the unprece-
nted phenomenon since 2013.
ypt does not have any singular law criminalising foreign terrorist fighting, though
s counterterrorism legislation does include language criminalising engaging with
reign organisations for the purposes of conducting terrorism inside and outside of
ypt. Article 86 of Egypt’s penal code, which was most recently amended in 1992,
tlines penalties up to capital punishment for individuals who are found to have
orked with foreign organisations to commit terrorist crimes in Egypt, and hard
bour for Egyptians who have cooperated with or joined organisations to commit
rrorist acts, even where they do not target Egypt. In 2015, President Abdel Fattah
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 Sisi, legislating by executive decree in the absence of a parliament, passed
ditional counter-terror legislation in 2015 designed to ‘stiffen’ the existing penal
de. This legislation, which was not explicitly tied to returning foreign-fighter
reats, does include provisions criminalising training with foreign terrorist organisa-
ons (including a minimum ten-year sentence) as well as for crimes committed
tside of Egypt.21
e 2017 US State Department terrorism report22 on Egypt mentioned adequate
reening procedures at airports. A new policy was introduced in 2014 that explicitly
ught to stem the flow of individuals joining terrorist organisations, which requires
y citizen aged 18 to 40 to obtain approval from the authorities before travelling to
rkey, Iraq or Syria. The policy was never fully publicly articulated, and rights groups
ve noted the broad application of travel bans and passport confiscation that
tend to political opposition, scholars and civil society actors.23
e State Department report also highlighted deficiencies in inter-agency communi-
tion between Egypt’s various security bodies and ‘significant physical border
curity concerns’ on the border with Gaza and Libya. A 2017 Transparency Interna-
onal report24 further alluded to potential corruption on the Libyan border, where
yptian officers were paid bribes to facilitate the flow of illicit goods and people. In
bruary 2018, the Egyptian military announced an escalated military campaign
omprehensive Operation Sinai 2018’ that sought to, according to military
okesman Tamer el Rifai, ‘comprehensively confront terrorism and other criminal
tivities’. The campaign, which remains ongoing, has seen operations in North Sinai
d the western border with Libya, and has seen increased coordination between
rious security branches. To date, the military has reported it has killed over 400
d arrested over 2,000 more in this campaign alone. Very little information has16
en publicised on the identities of those killed and arrested, the crimes they may
ve been suspected of, whether they had links to organisations or trained abroad.
reign fighter case studies
 assessing the ability of the Egyptian state – particularly its security and judicial
paratuses – to ensure that returnees are not able to continue to engage in terrorist
tivity, examining cases where fighters are alleged to have travelled abroad are
rticularly instructive. In prosecution related to an October 2017 attack on a convoy
The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, ‘Law Brief: Egypt’s Counterterrorism Law,’ August 2018. Availa-
ble at: https://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/TIMEP-Counterterrorism-Law-Brief.pdf
US Department of State, ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2017,’ September 2018. Available at: https://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/283100.pdf, p 129
Human Rights Watch, ‘Egypt: Scores Barred from Traveling,’ November 2015. Available at: https://
www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/01/egypt-scores-barred-traveling
A Hendawy, ‘Corruption: a lifeline for extremist groups in Libya,’ in Transparency International, ‘The big
spin: corruption and the growth of violent extremism,’ February 2017. Available at: http://ti-defence.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The_Big_Spin_Web.pdf, p 13
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 security personnel at the Bahariya Oasis, in which at least 16 military personnel
ere killed,25 43 defendants were charged with multiple offences including joining
IS, targeting security personnel, conducting a terrorist attack and premeditated
urder. According to the court proceedings, Libyan Abdel Rahim Muhammad
bdullah al-Masmari is alleged to have trained with Egyptian military-officer-turned
adist Emad Eldin Ahmed Mahmoud Abdel Hamid in Libya26 before the pair and an
known number of other men crossed the desert and formed a training camp on
e Egyptian side of the border, from which they are alleged to have carried out the
tack. Eleven days after having conducted the attack, al-Masmari was apprehended
 Egyptian security forces; Abdel Hamid was killed in an airstrike in Egypt on 3
ovember 2017, two weeks after the attack took place.
 an ongoing case against the organisation Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, 213 defendants
ce 54 separate charges, including the attempted assassination of former Interior
inister Mohamed Ibrahim in September 2013, attacks on the Cairo and Qalyubia
curity Directorates in 2014 and 2015, receiving military training abroad with the
tent of harming the Armed Forces and killing 40 police and military personnel as
ell as 15 civilians. The public prosecution alleged that at least five of the defendants
avelled to Syria through Turkey to receive military training, while others allegedly
ained in the military camps of Hamas’ armed wing, the Qassam Brigade. Some of
e defendants are alleged to be members of the Muslim Brotherhood acting in
lidarity, while other defendants are alleged to have pledged allegiance to Ansar
yt al-Maqdis due to the alternative life offered in combating the government
ther than living through continued financial hardships; nine of the defendants
ced military trial in another case, and six were executed in May 2016, amid outcry
om rights organisations over due process violations.17
 another case, 278 defendants were referred to trial in May 2018 for having alleg-
ly carried out 12 terrorist operations in various governorates throughout Egypt in
16 and 2017 under the guise of Hasm and Liwa Thawra, two domestic organisa-
ons that claimed assassinations of prominent government and military officials in
ypt. The public prosecution alleged that some of the defendants travelled to Sudan
 engage in military training as well as communicated with organisation leaders
sed in Turkey who provided guidance in conducting the terrorist operations. The
se remains open as of October 2018, and the names of defendants who allegedly
llaborated with foreign terror groups are not available.
hile unrelated to any act of violence that was carried out, in the ‘Libya Returnees’
se, 16 defendants faced various charges related to planned attacks including
longing to a terrorist organisation, targeting members of the Armed Forces, the
For more on the attack: The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, ‘Bahariya Oasis Incident,’ October 2017.
Available at: https://timep.org/esw/reports-briefs/bahariya-oasis-incident/
Also known as Abuhatam, the man was known to have been an associate of the former special forces
officer Hisham Ashmawy.
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lice, civilians and public facilities, and seven of the defendants were charged with
reign travel to engage with international organisations for terror purposes. The
iro Criminal Court sentenced two of the defendants to death, four to life imprison-
ent, one to 15 years’ imprisonment, seven to three years in prison, and two were
quitted (including American citizen Omar Hammam) in a November 2016 ruling,
ough the Court of Cassation overturned the sentences upon appeal and ordered a
trial in October 2018. Seven of the defendants were accused of having travelled to
bya, Mali and Syria to conduct training and to fight alongside al-Qaeda and ISIS
ements. Defendants were forcibly disappeared for periods ranging from three to
er 100 days; defendants were subsequently kept in pretrial detention past the
gally mandated two-year limit. Many attested to torture during detention and
hibited physical signs of mistreatment during their trial, though the judiciary did
t investigate this issue. Civil society organisations, notably the Egyptian Initiative
r Personal Rights, objected to the initial ruling in the case, arguing that any confes-
ons were given under coercion.
ken collectively, these cases demonstrate that, even across various time frames,
reign fighting locales and types of actors, there are very few instances in which
yptian law enforcement has been able to anticipate, detect threats from and
ccessfully seek prosecution against foreign fighters until after attacks have
curred. Only in the instance of the Libya returnees’ case, a case which was eventu-
ly overturned, were law enforcement able to seek prosecution for crimes related
 having travelled abroad before acts of violence were committed. The cases also
ise serious doubts as to the judiciary’s ability to deliver justice, prevent recidivism
d deter further radicalisation. The high instance of torture; the apparently indis-
iminate manner of gathering, analysing, and acting upon intelligence; the utilisa-18
on of mass trials that may include defendants who face politically motivated
arges; the levying of charges based on overly broad and vague national security
gislation; infringements on due process that do not allow for fair defence; and the
plication of the death penalty as a symbolic and retaliatory measure all immedi-
ely threaten any serious efforts to mitigate extremist violence.
etention and deradicalisation practices
lthough Egypt had sponsored deradicalisation efforts after the late 1990s (namely
pporting clerics or former EIJ or JI preachers advocating for nonviolence or ideolog-
al reform), these perhaps never truly amounted to ‘programmes’, as they relied
ostly on softening punitive measures and allowing endogenous efforts to flourish
 the groups themselves. Currently no similar efforts exist. Aside from military
erations and law enforcement efforts, Egypt has made few commitments to
untering or preventing radicalisation. Although Sisi has made vocal calls for
eligious revolution’, these have not been accompanied by action plans or strategic
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sion, but rather have resulted in efforts to conform religious thought to state-
proved norms. Examples include the standardisation of Friday sermons and the
plication of blasphemy laws against those with non-normative views.27 Yet stricter
ntrol of religious thought may have a negative impact, curtailing free expression
d debate and pushing nonconformists to extremes.
orse yet, Egyptian prisons have become notorious for fuelling radicalisation.28 A
N handbook on preventing pathways to extremist violence prioritises respect for
isoner rights and conducting rigorous risk assessments that guide detention
actices (including pretrial detention);29 in no case studied here were such practices
t in place. Academic literature also points to overcrowding as the most prevalent
riable leading to radicalisation across many contexts;30 Egypt’s prisons are notori-
sly overcrowded, and US State Department reports on human rights mention ‘life-
reatening prison conditions’ as among the most significant concerns for Egypt.31
deed, first-hand testimony from Egypt’s prisons confirms the success of jihadis’
forts to radicalise, by one prisoner’s account, ‘many people – not one or two or
ree, many’.32 Mohamed Soltan, founder of the DC-based Freedom Initiative, was
rested after the clearing of the Raba’a al-Adaweya protest camp and imprisoned in
ypt from 2013 to 2015 on charges of belonging to a terrorist group. He described
e conditions in the prison: political dissidents, Muslim Brotherhood supporters and
adis were all held together, and jihadis made concerted efforts to recruit and
vocate violence.33 In a congressional testimony, Soltan explained: ‘Inside prison,
ven the lack of space for dissent and a growing feeling of betrayal and abandon-
ent, is a very large and diverse crowd of young political prisoners who are more
sceptible to the process of radicalisation.’3419
For more, see: S Amin, ‘President Sisi’s Promise of Religious Revolution Remains Unfulfilled,’ Egyptian
Streets, July 2016. Available at: https://egyptianstreets.com/2016/07/05/president-sisis-promise-of-reli-
gious-revolution-remains-unfulfilled/
Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism and Mada Masr, ‘Made in Prison [Ar],’ December 2018. Availa-
ble at: https://arij.net/made_in_prison/
UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the
Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons,’ October 2016. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/
pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf
A Silke and T Veldhuis, ‘Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons: A Review of Key Recent Research and Crit-
ical Research Gaps,’ Perspectives on Terrorism, 11:5, October 2017.
US Department of State, ‘Egypt 2017 Human Rights Report,’ 2017. Available at: https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/277483.pdf
L Fadel, ‘As Egypt’s Jails Fill, Growing Fears of a Rise In Radicalization,’ NPR Morning Edition, August 2016.
Available at: https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/08/24/491170122/as-egypts-jails-fill-growing-
fears-of-a-rise-in-radicalization
D Kirkpatrick, ‘US Citizen, Once Held in Egypt’s Crackdown, Becomes Voice for Inmates,’ New York Times, 29
August 2015. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/29/world/middleeast/us-citizen-once-held-
in-egypts-crackdown-becomes-voice-for-inmates.html
M Soltan, Testimony before US House of Representatives Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, November
2015. Available at: https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/sites/humanrightscommission.house.gov/
files/documents/Mohamed%20Soltan%20Testimony_0.pdf
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en more alarming, former detainees describe the treatment of jihadis as being
perior to those of other prisoners, particularly political prisoners. By some
counts, jihadis may have freer movement, access to cell phones or visits and access
 literature while in prison. Soltan related how a man who had ‘narrated the
ogression of his change in allegiance from al Qaeda to the “Islamic State”‘
lebrated his release from prison on the day that some of those in Soltan’s case
ceived death penalty sentences.35 These practices create a dynamic much like with
her prison gangs, encouraging radicalisation for the sake of protection or preferen-
al treatment. By other accounts, those who do not join may face violence at the
nds of the jihadis.36 In August 2018, political activist Ahmed Douma reported
ysical assaults from those his family described as ‘members of Wilayat Sinai’: while
tending a retrial hearing, Douma was left in an area open to those who had previ-
sly verbally harassed him, calling him an infidel. This time, the men attacked him,
d prison guards were forced to intervene to quell the uprising. A statement from
s family reported that this was the third time a similar scenario had happened and
estioned whether the neglect was intentional on the part of the Interior
inistry.37
ights and security implications
hile the importance of rights in practices and norms surrounding returning fighters
nd in counter-terror, counter-extremism and counter-insurgency (COIN)
proaches more broadly) may seem obvious, it cannot be understated. Domestic
ghts protections, as well as legal and prosecutorial norms that consider and respect
ternational human rights law, form a basis to protect or advocate on behalf of the
ghts of defendants in terrorism cases in many countries, no matter how brutal the20
imes of which they are accused or taboos surrounding them. In Egypt, however,
is is not the case. Rights protections have been so severely eroded that every case
amined herein contains a rights violation, a violation of international law and, in
any cases, even the spirit (or letter) of the Egyptian constitution and law. Further-
ore, little recourse is available to advocate for more humane treatment or to seek
stice where violations occur.
yond a social stigma associated with breaking taboos, those who have repre-
nted defendants in terrorism cases have themselves become victims of harass-
ent in media and on the part of the state: this was the case with lawyer Yasmin
Soltan, 2015.
Fadel, 2016.
A Douma, Facebook post [Ar], August 13, 2018. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/Douma.Page/
photos/a.699103076835026/1943947842350537/?type=3&theater; and Mada Masr, ‘Family of impris-
oned activist Ahmed Douma reveals details of assault,’ August 18, 2018. Available at: https://
madamasr.com/en/2018/08/18/news/u/family-of-imprisoned-activist-ahmed-douma-reveals-details-of-
assault/
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osam el Din, who had represented 22-year-old Mahmoud Shafiq Mohammed
ustafa, the suicide bomber who killed 24 in a 2016 attack on St Mark’s Cathedral in
iro, in a 2014 case in which he was arrested on suspicion of belonging the Muslim
otherhood. After the church attack, Hosam el Din posted details about her client’s
ior case on Facebook, including information that he had been tortured while in
stody in 2015. Hosam el Din was subject to a vicious media campaign fuelled by the
untry’s intelligence agencies, and members of parliament called for her to be
vestigated on suspicion of attempting to undermine the state.38 Similar campaigns
 harassment against rights lawyers are widespread and often more severe (though
t limited to the defence in terrorism cases); rights lawyers have recently been
rested en masse on national security charges.39
e tendency to disregard or downplay rights protection in approaches to countering
rror is, of course, not unique to Egypt, but because the dynamic has consequences
at extend beyond the wellbeing of the individual, it risks undermining global efforts
 counter terrorism. Intelligence gathered from torture or forced confessions is
reliable and may lead to faulty analysis or fail to inform effective action. Further-
ore, the collection of intelligence elicited by torture raises serious questions about
e reliability, ethics and legality of intelligence sharing with Egypt. Indeed, Egypt is
e of the 67 member countries in the global coalition to fight ISIS, which lists as part
 the coalition’s mandate the development of information-sharing agreements,
rticularly with regard to the issue of foreign fighters.40 Little information is made
ailable about which countries participate in these specific endeavours and to what
tent. International law is unequivocal in a universal and absolute ban on torture,
d a 2001 report from the International Law Commission clearly establishes respon-
bility for a state aiding or assisting another state in a wrongful act, which legal21
holars argue may make international partners responsible when sharing informa-
on in counter-terror efforts.41
M Fares, M El Sayed and R El Masry, ‘Yasmin Hossam incites against the state after church bomber’s iden-
tity released [Ar],’ Youm7, 12 December 2017. Available at: https://bit.ly/2RvSsc2; on the control of media
by intelligence bodies, Reporters Without Borders, ‘Egyptian intelligence services extend control over
media,’ September 2017. Available at: https://rsf.org/en/news/egyptian-intelligence-services-extend-
control-over-media; and H Bahgat, ‘Looking into the latest acquisition of Egyptian media companies by
general intelligence,’ Mada Masr, 21 December 2017. Available at: https://madamasr.com/en/2017/12/
21/feature/politics/looking-into-the-latest-acquisition-of-egyptian-media-companies-by-general-intelli-
gence/
Human Rights Watch, ‘Egypt: Mass Arrests of Lawyers, Activists,’ November 2018. Available at: https://
www.hrw.org/news/2018/11/18/egypt-mass-arrests-lawyers-activists
The Global Coalition, ‘Impeding the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters,’ February 2017. Available at: http://
theglobalcoalition.org/en/preventing-the-flow-foreign-fighters/
UN General Assembly, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 53rd session, 26
November 2001. Available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a56589.pdf; and for more on
international legal obligations in the global war on terror: https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/view-
content.cgi?article=1193&context=annlsurvey; and Association for the Prevention of Torture, ‘Beware the
Gift of Poison Fruit: Sharing Information with States that Torture,’ 2012: https://www.apt.ch/content/files_
res/report-exclusionary-rule-workshop-en.pdf
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onclusion
e relationship between international law and global efforts to counter terrorism is
early stated in UN Security Council Resolution 2178 of 2014, which calls on states
 address the issue of foreign fighters: ‘respect for human rights, fundamental
eedoms and the rule of law are complementary and mutually reinforcing with
fective counter-terrorism measures’,42 as well as the ensuing 2015 Madrid Princi-
es developed by the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee headed
erhaps ironically) by Egypt’s ambassador to the UN. With this in mind, and outside
 legal or ethical responsibility, the manner in which (and support for the manner in
hich) Egypt is currently dealing with returning fighters is unproductive. It not only
ils to prevent violence; it also reinforces and recreates the same dynamics that led
any to the decision to embrace extremist violence and to travel abroad in its
rsuit.
ther, adequately and appropriately addressing the threat posed by returning FTFs
quires both specific measures taken and systemic legal and security sector reform.
 begin, Egypt should establish explicit legislation and security policy that deals with
ose suspected of having trained or committed terrorist acts abroad. To do so will
quire reform of existing anti-terror legislation to consolidate the laws and bring
em in line with international legal standards, eliminating overly broad language
d allowing them to be used to specifically target the highest threats. More
rgeted legislation and prosecution will have the additional effect of mitigating
ercrowding, exposure and radicalisation in prisons, by ensuring that mass trials
d sentencing do not result in non-violent offenders facing terrorism charges and
tention with those who have committed terrorist acts. Allegations of corruption
ong border security, torture and other rights abuses at the hands of security22
rsonnel, and high death rates reported in counter-terrorism operations should be
vestigated to ensure that resources are most effectively being used to target threat
tors and that intelligence gathered is reliable and may lead to more effective
erations and prosecutions. Implementing such reforms is the first step to bring an
terruption in the cycle of extremist violence present in Egypt for decades, and
hich, as many of the cases presented here illustrate, has perpetuated and exacer-
ted cycles of extremist violence worldwide for decades.
UN Security Council Resolution 2178, 2014. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?
symbol=S/RES/2178%20%282014%29
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1OROCCO’S RESPONSE TO FOREIGN TERRORIST 
IGHTERS: TIGHTER SECURITY AND DERADICALISATION
ATHYA KENZA BERRADA
orocco has successfully prevented terrorist attacks over the past few years, in spite
 a real jihadi challenge. More than a thousand Moroccans joined Islamic State (ISIS)
d other terrorist groups in war zones. While not a new phenomenon, the number of
oroccans among foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) is significant and unprecedented.
e security component remains at the heart of the Moroccan approach to tackling
e issue of local jihadists and returning foreign fighters. Nevertheless, Morocco has
so engaged in reforming its legal system and introducing de-radicalisation
ogrammes in jails. More broadly, Morocco engaged more than a decade ago in
forming the religious sphere with the aim of countering the radical religious
etoric perceived to be at the root of the problem.
oroccan foreign terrorist fighters in Syria and Iraq
 a speech in summer 2014, ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi singled out Morocco
 a potential target for terrorist attacks. The terrorist threat was not new to
orocco, and the authorities never underestimated that threat, but the speech
ought back to the surface the specific risks related to the return of FTFs, either
eking to commit attacks or to inspire others to do so. With the exception of the23
lling of two Scandinavian backpackers in the Atlas Mountains in December 2018, no
rrorist attacks have occurred since the 2011 Marrakesh bombing in the very
uristic site of Jama Al Fana, which killed 17 people and injured more than 20 others.
e attack was attributed to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), although the
oup denied responsibility. In a recent development, Moroccan authorities arrested
veral members of a terrorist cell in April 2019, led by a returnee from Syria. He was
legedly planning attacks in Morocco.1
ue to the scarcity of independent research on the number of Moroccan FTFs, most
 the data available come directly from official Moroccan authorities and more
ecifically from the Moroccan Ministry of Interior and the Central Bureau of
diciary Investigation (Bureau Central d’Investigation Judiciaire, BCIJ), a special unit
 charge of terrorism-related activities. The small number of reports from
Latifa Al Arosni, ‘Morocco Arrests Terror Cell Led by Former Fighter in Syria’, Asharq Al awasat, 11 April
2019, https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1674796/morocco-arrests-terror-cell-led-former-fighter-
syria?amp&__twitter_impression=true
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dependent sources, such as the Wilson Center,2 the Washington Post3 or the
nited Nations (UN),4 reveal figures that are merely reflecting or very similar to the
es disclosed by the Moroccan authorities.
gures in this paper come mostly from an internal BCIJ document.5 The document is
ore comprehensive than other available sources as it discloses information on
nder and affiliation to specific jihadi groups. According to this internal document,
e number of Moroccans who travelled to Syria and Iraq between 2013 and 2017
talled 1,664 individuals. It is estimated that this figure includes 285 women and
8 children. A report by the security and intelligence consultancy AICS had a slightly
gher estimate for the number of Moroccan foreign fighters in both Syria and Iraq:
total of 1,800 FTFs.6
cruitment of Moroccan foreign fighters increased and reached its peak between
ne and December 2013. During that six-month period, more than 900 Moroccans
ined the fight in Syria. The majority of them joined ISIS.
ot all Moroccans travelled all the way to the Levant, however. A number of them
ent to less-distant Libya. They are estimated at around 300 by Moroccan authori-
es, as of January 2018. No information was available with regard to group affilia-
on, age or gender with regard to that contingent.
Table 1: Moroccan FTFs in Syria, Iraq and Libya
Moroccan FTFs in Syria/Iraq: 1,664
Age/Sex Affiliation
Men: 1,001 ISIS: 929
Women: 285 Harakat sham al Islam: 100
Children: 378 Jabhat Nusra: 5024
 Europeans of Moroccan origin were included, the official estimate would probably
crease to somewhere between 2,000 and 2,500 fighters in total. The issue of
nationals is of a critical importance for Moroccan authorities as Europeans of
Aaron Y Zelin, ‘The Others: Foreign Fighters in Libya’’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/PolicyNote45-Zelin.pdf
Tim Meko, ‘Now that the Islamic State has fallen in Iraq and Syria, where are all its fighters going?’, Wash-
ington Post, 22 February 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/isis-returning-
fighters/?utm_term=.edb3f0ecef3f
Tamba Koudounou, ‘1,473 Moroccan Jihadists Fighting with Resilient ISIS’, Morocco World News, 15 August
2018, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/08/252192/1473-moroccan-jihadists-fighting-with-resil-
ient-isis/
Data directly provided by the Moroccan Central Investigation Bureau on March 2018. The document is an
internal one but can be disclosed publicly.
‘Morocco should brace for return of ISIS foreign fighters’, The North Africa Post, 3 February 2018, http://
northafricapost.com/22063-morocco-brace-return-hundreds-foreign-fighters-report.html
 Others: 585
Moroccan FTFs in Libya: 300
TOTAL Moroccan FTFs: 1,964
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oroccan descent generally maintain strong family ties with their Moroccan
latives and may decide to return to Morocco rather than to Europe to go under-
ver. Furthermore, as European governments increasingly strip binationals
nvicted or suspected of terrorism of their European citizenship, a number of
ropean FTFs have already and will continue to be expelled to Morocco, thus
rther adding to the figures and to the burden.
cruitment for jihad started against the background of the Syrian uprising, which
hoed most of the Arab Spring movements. At that time, Morocco was a member
untry in the Group of Friends of the Syrian People and hosted its fourth meeting in
arrakech, in December 2012. It was during this meeting that the Syrian National
alition was recognised as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.
uring that period, sheikhs across the Sunni Islamic world called for the support of
nni communities in Syria, which may have been interpreted by young Moroccans
 an official endorsement of the war. The jihadi recruitment rhetoric was articulated
ound religious references and symbols coupled with videos and pictures of the
imes of the Assad regime against civilians and the failure of Western countries to
op the massacres. This context boosted the recruitment of young Moroccans to
in jihadi groups in Syria.
ccording to the Moroccan government spokesperson, Mustapha Al Khalfi, 80
rcent of Moroccan FTFs were recruited via social networks, namely Facebook and
itter.7 An overall number of 377 Facebook and Twitter accounts linked to ISIS
ere removed during the first months of 2017, according to the same source. The
te of 80 percent online recruitment may seem very high compared with other avail-
le figures in Europe. However, it may be explained by the fact that social control
d population surveillance is stronger in Morocco, which leads jihadi groups to25
vour online networks rather than face-to-face recruitment.
ost Moroccan FTFs have joined Syria via a conventional route, which started with
flight from Casablanca airport to Istanbul followed by a bus trip to Gaziantep in
uthern Turkey, or Jarablus, which are the neighbouring cities by the Syrian border.
 should be mentioned that Moroccans do not need a visa to travel to Turkey.
owever, when the authorities tightened their control in September 201 as
oroccan forces joined the military coalition against ISIS, jihadists started to opt for
ternative itineraries, with stopovers in Tunisia or, in some cases, made their way
rough Algeria into Libya, before traveling to Syria.
ith regard to the profile of Moroccan FTFs, there are very few studies on their
cio-economic background prior to joining terrorist groups. One of the rare studies
ailable, by the Observatoire du Nord des droits de l’Homme, a local Moroccan
‘80% of Moroccan youth recruited through social media’, Moroccan World News, 26 May 2017, https://
www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/05/217773/80-of-moroccan-youth-in-isis-recruited-through-social-
media-minister/
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GO, found that two-thirds of FTFs were under the age of 25, and three-quarters
longed to the deprived strata that lived in the slums of big and medium-sized cities
ch as Casablanca, Salé and Tangier, with less than one quarter qualifying as middle
ass.8 Northern Morocco, particularly the region of Tangier-Tetouan-Al Hoceima,
s historically been an area where disenfranchised youth have been recruited into
olent extremist activities. This region of Morocco suffers from high rates of illit-
acy, school drop-out and unemployment, and is known as a breeding ground for
ansnational terrorist networks.9
nsurprisingly, the study implied that joining jihadi groups in war zones is more of a
uth and urban phenomenon. It should be remembered that jihadists responsible
r the Casablanca bombings of 2003 emerged from the same socio-economic
ilieu. In 2005, Morocco launched a new socio-economic development initiative
titled the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH). The underlining idea
hind this initiative was that poverty and social inequality are serious challenges to
litical stability and social cohesion, and that poverty was a factor feeding radicali-
tion, if at least indirectly. Today, the outcomes of the INDH are mixed at best; while
e initiative has helped create some thousands of income-generating small-scale
tivities, it has not triggered the level of socio-economic development articulated as
s objective.
 number of FTFs also share a previous judiciary experience. According to Moroccan
thorities, 225 of the 1,664 Moroccan FTFs – which represents roughly 13% – were
eviously condemned for terrorism-related activities. Meanwhile, this also means
at 87% of the FTFs were not involved in terrorism before, although they may have
en involved in criminal activities.26
ith a few exceptions, most Moroccan FTFs within ISIS were foot soldiers. According
 Moroccan officials,10 there were only three Moroccans in high-ranking positions in
IS, including the position of a judge in the city of Mosul, the head of the communi-
tions department, and the governor of the Turkmen mountains.
entually, the setbacks suffered by ISIS in both Iraq and Syria forced thousands of
Fs to go back to their home countries. According to official Moroccan sources, 596
ople from the initial 1,664 (which represents 35.8% of the official Moroccan FTFs
timate) were killed either committing suicide attacks or in the different battles and
alition air strikes in both Syria and Iraq by the end of 2017.
UNESCO Report, ‘Jeunesse et Extrémisme Violent’, 18 April 2017, http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/
MULTIMEDIA/FIELD/Rabat/images/SHS/20170418JeunesseExtremismeViolent.pdf
USAID, ‘Democracy and Governance, 5 November 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/morocco/democracy-and-
governance
Mohammed Masbah, ‘Moroccan Foreign Fighters’, Berlin: SWP, 10/2015, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/
publication/moroccan-foreign-fighters/
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ccording to the same sources, the number of returnees at the same date totalled
3, which only represents 12.8% of the total number of Moroccan FTFs. This means
at half of the FTFs are still in war zones, either fighting with jihadi groups or
ptured by local Syrian/Iraqi/Kurdish authorities. The 213 returnees are divided as
llows: 146 adult men, 52 women and 15 children. Approximately 200 returnees –
most all of them – have been brought to justice in Morocco and are now in jail. A
port by the security and intelligence consultancy AICS estimates the number of
reign fighters who may return to Morocco at 900 individuals.11 However, this
ould imply the return of all FTFs still alive in conflict zones, which is highly unlikely.
revious waves of Moroccan foreign fighters
oroccans joining Islamic terrorist groups abroad are not a new phenomenon.
itially, a dozen Moroccans travelled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to participate in
e Afghan war against the Soviet occupation.
hen the Taliban came to power in 1996, a group called the Moroccan Islamic
mbatant Group (Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain, GICM) was formed to
present Moroccan fighters who decided to settle down in Afghanistan and plan for
tacks in Morocco at a later stage. The Casablanca attacks of 2003 were attributed
 a group with ties to the GICM, as well as the 2004 Madrid bombings. Members of
e GICM were considered to be part of broader international jihadi networks linked
 al-Qaeda, with ramifications in Europe. A pamphlet described as the ‘birth certifi-
te of the GICM’, calling notably for the elimination of King Hassan II, was discov-
ed during a major police operation in Belgium in 1998.12 There are, however, no
ailable data on the number of returnees of this first wave of Moroccan foreign27
hters, as they were not then considered a major threat due to their small numbers.
 new wave of Moroccan fighters joined Iraq following the American invasion in
03. It is estimated that around 200-300 Moroccans managed to join the fight in
aq, but most ended up killed or jailed there.
fter the 2003 Casablanca attacks, a number of figures in the Moroccan Salafi
ovement were arrested and received sentences of 20 to 30 years imprisonment.
ese included some veterans from Afghanistan, highlighting the security threat
sed by returnees. In contrast, some of these historical figures of jihad in Morocco
gaged in a process of ideological revision, called ‘Morajaa’. They wrote long letters
 which they affirmed that they were reviewing their ideological stands and
opting a more moderate interpretation of Islam (i.e. deradicalisation); renouncing
‘Morocco should brace for return of ISIS foreign fighters’, The North Africa Post, 3 February 2018, http://
northafricapost.com/22063-morocco-brace-return-hundreds-foreign-fighters-report.html
A Grignard, ‘The Islamist networks in Belgium: Between nationalism and globalisation’, in R. Coolsaet (ed),
Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe, London: Ashgate, 2008.
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e use of violence (i.e. disengagement); and not opposing the state authority. Some
 the important figures of the Salafi movement who engaged in this ideological
vision benefited from the royal pardon and were freed from jail in 2010. They have
come influential voices of moderation. The most famous of them is Abou Hafs,
ho has been invited on TV and radio programmes and is now advocating for liberal
forms in Islam, including improving the status of women.
 is difficult to establish clear links between the previous waves of jihadi fighters and
e new wave of FTFs, but some veteran fighters seem to have had a certain influ-
ce. That is notably the case of Brahim Benchekroun, a veteran Afghanistan fighter
d ex-Guantanamo detainee (2002-2004) who joined Syria in 2011 and created
arakat Sham Al Islam, a jihadi group mostly composed of Moroccan fighters and
sociated with al-Qaeda. The other known exception is Fatiha Hassani, who joined
IS in 2014. She is the widow of Karim Mejjati, a senior Al-Qaeda leader in Afghani-
an who was killed in 2005 and allegedly involved in the Casablanca bombings as
ell as the 2004 Madrid bombings and 2005 London attacks.
ealing with returnees
e fight against terrorism is presented in the official Moroccan discourse as a
curity priority. This fight is mainly centred around a multidimensional strategy
erated by strong, coordinated security and intelligence institutions. The issue of
turnees has gained more importance in recent years given its unprecedented
agnitude. However, the issue is treated within the overall framework of fighting
rrorism, with no specific programme focused on FTFs.
bdelhak Khiam, head of the BCIJ, stated that Morocco is unrelenting in its crack-28
wn on the returning foreign fighters who joined the ranks of ISIS.13 He also added
at the Moroccan authorities have arrested and brought to justice more than 200
turnees, with the suspects serving sentences ranging from 10 to 15 years in prison.
ch declarations highlight the centrality of the security component in the Moroccan
proach to fighting Islamic violent extremism, although this approach is comple-
ented with other measures.
curity and legal approach
e Moroccan security approach has been articulated around the creation of new
ti-terrorism mechanisms, the reinforcement of security services and the active
smantling of suspected terrorist cells.
‘Morocco Cracks Down on Returning IS fighters’, The North Africa Post, May 2018, http://northafrica-
post.com/23511-morocco-cracks-returning-fighters-official.html
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e BCIJ was created in 2015. It is a high-level security unit often referred to as the
oroccan FBI and is in charge of anti-terrorism, weapon smuggling and kidnapping.
is entity is under the direct supervision of the Moroccan Direction générale de la
rveillance du territoire (DGST). The BCIJ holds regular press conferences to
mmunicate nationally and internationally on the dismantling of terrorist networks
d reduction of threat levels.
dditionally, a new prevention security mechanism called Hadar (‘vigilance’) was
eated. The mechanism involves the deployment of armed elements of the Royal
rmed Forces, the Royal Gendarmerie, the police and auxiliary forces in main
rategic locations such as airports, train stations, administrative buildings and some
uristic areas.
 the context of the fight against terrorism, Morocco also invested in reinforcing its
telligence services. The Moroccan security services operate initially via a network
 both official agents and informants who have developed an expertise in detecting
bit change which may indicate radicalisation. Approximately 50,000 of
ese mqadmin (auxiliary agents) mandated by the Moroccan Ministry of Interior are
ployed across the country and act as informants who report back on any unusual
haviour.
 addition to traditional informants’ networks, it is claimed that Morocco has
quired mass surveillance technologies to monitor phone calls and online
arches.14
e information provided by informants and security officials has helped in the
tection of suspected terrorist cells. According to Moroccan authorities, 168
rrorist cells had been dismantled and 2,963 people were arrested in the period29
tween 2001 and 2017. In the shorter timespan between 2011 and 2017, 97 cells
ere dismantled, 44 of which had a direct link with ISIS.
 should, however, be noted that it is not entirely clear what constitutes a terrorist
ll or what activities are specifically targeted by the services. The Moroccan author-
ies break up suspected cells at an early stage even before members of the cell have
veloped any meaningful plan of action.
e Moroccan intelligence services have also been a source of valuable intelligence
formation about transnational jihadi networks for several Western countries,
cluding Spain and France. According to Jean-Michel Fauvergue, previous Director
eneral of the French anti-terrorism police unit (RAID), information delivered by the
oroccan intelligence services was essential to finding the coordinator of the
ovember 2015 attack in Paris.15 Due to the prominent role played by members of
‘Facing the Truth: Hacking Team Leak Confirms Moroccan Government Use of Spyware,’ Privacyinterna-
tional.org, 10 July 2015.
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e Moroccan diaspora in Europe, and following the Barcelona attacks in 2017, it was
nounced that the BCIJ’s mission would be expanded to surveillance of the
oroccan diaspora in Europe,16 which is likely to have an impact on the monitoring
 some European returnees of Moroccan descent. It should be highlighted that
orocco cooperates with a number of European countries on counter-terrorism.
owever, beyond bilateral relationships, Morocco-EU security cooperation could be
mplicated by a recent ruling of the European Court of Justice, in December 2016,
ainst the country’s claim to Western Sahara. It should be remembered that
orocco’s response to similar rulings in the past was to suspend cooperation for
veral months – including security cooperation and information exchange.
t the international level, Moroccan Royal Armed Forces joined the US-led coalition
ainst ISIS in Iraq and Syria in 2014. It should also be noted that Morocco is an active
ember of international platforms on countering terrorism such as the Global
unter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF). Within the context of the GCTF, Morocco and the
etherlands established a working group on FTFs. The working group provides a
atform for developing practical initiatives to help coordinate and build on efforts at
e national, regional and international levels to address the complex issues related
 FTFs’ return.
 response to the FTF mobilisation and in line with global efforts in which it was
rectly involved, Morocco amended its penal code. Following the adoption of the
nited Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), the Moroccan parliament
vised the 2003 anti-terrorism law that was quickly adopted by the Moroccan
rliament after the 2003 Casablanca attacks, and facilitated the arrest of more than
000 individuals between 2003 and 2007.30
e 2014 anti-terrorism law provided amendments to the previous anti-terrorism
w in including heavy penalties from 5 to 15 years in prison, and fines up to 500,000
oroccan Dirham (€45,000) for any Moroccan who joins or tries to join any type of
n-state armed organisation, whether inside or outside Morocco. This provides for
legal framework to prosecute FTFs.
e-radicalisation programmes in prison
hile the Moroccan jails have historically had a bad reputation and sad human rights
cords, recent efforts have been deployed to improve the situation. As such, the
oroccan General Commission for the Management of Prisons and Reintegration, in
Steven Jambot, ‘Attentats de Paris: le rôle du Maroc dans la localisation d’Abdelhamid Abaaoud’, France24,
20 November 2015, available at https://www.france24.com/fr/20151120-attaques-paris-role-maroc-abdel-
hamid-abaaoud-renseignements-france-paris-raba
‘AP Interview: Morocco to Expand Counterterror Efforts Abroad’, VOA News, 20 September 2017, available
at https://www.voanews.com/a/ap-interview-morocco-to-expand-counterterror-efforts-abroad/
4036984.html
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rtnership with the UN Development Programme and the Japanese government,
s led a large-scale project to modernise the Moroccan prison system. Moreover,
orocco has announced that it will build 36 new prisons by 2020.17
ithin this larger context of prison modernisation, the Moroccan general adminis-
ation of prisons launched in 2016 a programme named ‘Moussalaha’18 – Arabic for
econciliation’ – which aims at de-radicalisation and reintegration of jihadists. The
ogramme has been designed for both returnees and terrorist convicts who never
ft the country.
e reconciliation programme conducted within prisons was developed in collabora-
on between the Moroccan General administration of prison, the Council of
ligious Scholars and the Moroccan Council for Human Rights.
e programme takes place over a period of four months and is a mixture of lectures
d workshops. The programme is articulated around psychological counselling,
eological teachings and reintegration into society.
s for its first iteration in 2016, the 25 prisoners who enrolled in the programme
ere individuals belonging to different jihadi groups, some of whom had been
ndemned to capital punishment. Enrolment in the programme is on a voluntary
sis, and participants who successfully completed the programme are freed from
ison following a royal pardon. As such, 14 prisoners were released following the
st iteration. The mentors in charge of the programme receive specific trainings.
rty-seven mentors were trained for the first edition of the programme. In 2018,
e number of beneficiaries increased to an estimated 300 prisoners across jails in
ur different cities: Casablanca, Tangier, Tifelt and Meknes.1931
me prisoners who belong to Islamist groups and who have not chosen to enrol in
e Moussalaha programme complain that they are victims of systematic discrimina-
ons. Such alleged discriminations include a shorter time allocated for phone calls,
mily visits and walks authorised by the administration of the prison.
hile it is too early to evaluate the programme, its elaboration represents a
radigm shift in the way Moroccan authorities tackle the issue, evolving from a
rely security-led approach to a more comprehensive approach, including de-
dicalisation and re-integration programmes.
Mouna Qacimi, ‘Le Gouvernement Prévoit 36 Nouveaux Pénitenciers pour Désengorger les Prisons’, Le360,
30 April 2017, available at http://fr.le360.ma/societe/le-gouvernement-prevoit-36-nouveaux-penitenciers-
pour-desengorger-les-prisons-117405.
‘Reconciliation program, a new Moroccan way to fight violent extremism’, Al Maghreb Alaan, October
2017.
Solene Paillard, ‘Lancement d’un plan de déradicalisation religieuse dans les prisons’, Yabiladi, 25 May
2018, available at https://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/65250/maroc-lancement-d-un-plan-deradical-
isation.html
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t, one of the major criticisms over the programme is that it lacks continuity after
e incarceration period. When programme beneficiaries leave prison, they find it
fficult to reintegrate into society. This is due in part to social stigma, but also to the
ck of economic resources and social skills needed to be part of society. The Moussa-
ha programme includes some aspects related to the development of social skills,
t economic reintegration and support for families are still lacking.
ere are no known civil society organisation (CSO) programmes geared directly
ward the reintegration of returnees and ex-jihadi following their release. The
sence of such programmes can be explained by CSOs’ fear of being perceived as
fending and supporting terrorism. Most of the programmes of Moroccan CSOs are
cused on countering radical speech instead.
eforming the religious sphere
nce 2005, Morocco has engaged in what is often termed a reform of the religious
here, aimed at countering radical religious narratives while preserving the
oroccan version of Islam, which is described as moderate. As such, this reform can
 viewed more as part of a counter-narrative rather than a direct prevention of
dicalisation.
e reform was articulated around modernising the work of religious institutions
ch the Council of Religious Scholars and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and
suring greater transparency when it comes to the financing of mosques and other
ligious activities.
orocco also contributes to the training of future imams based in France by32
cepting them in its different theological centres. As of 2018, the Mohamed VI Insti-
te for the Training of Imams in Rabat accepted 55 French imams in training.20
oncerns and criticisms over the Moroccan approach
hile the Moroccan approach to fighting terrorism may be qualified as efficient in
e sense that the country has not witnessed terrorist attacks since 2011 (until
ecember 2018), it is still very much security-driven, with little room for prevention.
ith the exception of the Moussalaha prison programme, there are no other
habilitation or reintegration programmes. Additionally, no programmes have been
t in place to tackle specifically the issue of returnees, who are treated like all other
rrorists. Due to the fact that returnees were in war zones, trained to use weapons
d were part of larger network, it would possibly make sense to develop tailored
Amyne Asmlal, ‘Ces Imams Etrangers qui seront formés par le Maroc en 2018’, le360, November 2017,
available at http://fr.le360.ma/politique/ces-imams-etrangers-qui-seront-formes-par-le-maroc-en-2018-
143245
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ogrammes for them. The issue of women and children returnees is also left
addressed.
kewise, the topic of binationals who may be stripped of their European citizenship
llowing terrorist charges is also left unaddressed. Indeed, terrorist attacks in
ropean countries coupled with the intensified risk of FTF returns have pushed a
mber of EU Member States to expand legal provisions on the revocation of citizen-
ip as a measure to fight terrorism. Over the past four years, an important number
 Moroccan binationals have already been expelled from Europe, following suspi-
on of terrorist activities.
iven the number of European FTFs or ‘radicalised individuals’ who also hold
oroccan citizenship, this trend is unlikely to stop any time soon. While Moroccan
thorities have not communicated on how they treat this issue, the return of those
otential) terrorists will add to the burden of dealing with the returnees, reempha-
sing the need for a strong EU–Morocco cooperation.
nother concern related to the Moroccan counter-terrorism approach is that the
oroccan government may restrict different forms of civil liberties in the name of
e fight against terrorism. A number of Moroccan-based NGOs, such as the National
uncil on Human Rights, criticised the cyclical arrests of Salafi figures not involved
 any terrorism activities. The Moroccan authorities’ relationship with the Salafi
ovement can be described as complex. On the one hand, the Moroccan authorities
ay feel the need to exercise surveillance over the movement to prevent potential
tacks. On the other hand, the authorities seek to use the non-violent fraction of
lafi Islam to counter the jihadi one.
dditionally, following the publication of a link to a video attributed to al-Qaeda, the33
itor of Lakome, a Moroccan online platform, was arrested and judged in 2013
der the anti-terrorism laws. This arrest was condemned by international organisa-
ons such as Reporters without Borders and Amnesty International. It was seen as a
eans to silence journalists and freedom of press21 and an abuse of the counter-
rrorism legislation. The recent broadening of the counter-terrorism legal frame-
ork will not appease such concerns.
st but not least, there are concerns related to torture allegations. In its 2017
port, Human Rights Watch stated that it remained concerned by continued allega-
ons of torture and mistreatment by Moroccan government agents, in particular of
rsons suspected of terrorism. The Moroccan constitution and legal system prohibit
ch practices, and the government denies it allows the use of torture. In October
17, at a North Africa regional meeting for the national mechanisms for the preven-
‘Drop all charges against Moroccan journalist Ali Anouzla – let him go free, once and for all’, January 2016,
available at https://rsf.org/en/news/drop-all-charges-against-moroccan-journalist-ali-anouzla-let-him-go-
free-once-and-all
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on of torture, the Moroccan Minister of State for Human Rights, Mustapha Ramid,
knowledged that torture occurred in isolated cases, but said it was no longer a
stematic practice and the government was working to eradicate it.
onclusion
orocco has been successful in preventing terrorist attacks and getting intelligence
formation which has been helpful locally and internationally. However, counter-
rrorism efforts are still narrowly constrained within a security-approach frame-
ork while poorly tackling social, economic and governance challenges.
hile security measures are a crucial element in the fight against terrorism, they
ould not distract from the need to address broader concerns. In the face of an
precedented jihadi mobilisation, Moroccan authorities should pursue much
oader socio-economic reforms and governance issues, along with softer preven-
on programmes. The EU and other international partners should ensure that they
main committed to encouraging and supporting efforts to reduce the socio-
onomic disparities and lack of opportunities that remain the public’s most pressing
sues in Morocco and the major conducive factor to radicalisation.34
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6ETURNING FOREIGN FIGHTERS: UNDERSTANDING 
HE NEW THREAT LANDSCAPE IN TUNISIA
MNA BEN MUSTAPHA BEN ARAB
 spite of conflicting estimates, Tunisia appears to have the highest ratio of foreign
hters per capita in the world.1 Previous figures varied between 6,000 departees to
ria and Iraq, according to the Soufan Group in 2015, and 7,000 according to the
nited Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.2 Although these
timates have now been revised to around 3,000, according to the Tunisian author-
ies,3 they remain unprecedented, not least considering the additional 27,000
nisians prevented from travelling to Libya and Syria.4 In addition, 1,000 to 1,500
nisians are believed to have joined jihadi groups in neighbouring Libya.5
lthough the involvement of Tunisian jihadists in foreign wars is not new, it never
atched the post-2011 mobilisation. Only 400 Tunisians joined the ‘Afghan Arabs’
ho fought against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.6 But the 2003 invasion of Iraq by
e US-led coalition forces represented a landmark in the emergence of a new gener-
ion of jihadists that built on the legacy of the older generation, which had fought
 Afghanistan as well as in Chechnya and the Balkans. Veteran fighters built recruit-
ent and logistics networks that facilitated travel to Iraq between 2002 and 2010
d ensured continuity after 2011. The Tunisian national Seifallah Ben Hassine,
own as Abu Iyadh Attounisi, illustrates this ‘veteran effect’. He fought in Afghani-
an and Chechnya and founded the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG) in 2000, which35
obilised Tunisians for global jihad, provided support to Algerian jihadists linked to
-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and plotted attacks in Europe. Following the
11 general amnesty by the Tunisian government in the aftermath of the Arab
ring, he was released from prison and played a pivotal role given his experience in
B Dodwell, D Milton and D Rassler, ‘The Caliphate’s Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s
Foreign Fighter Paper Trail’, West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, April 2016, available at: https://
ctc.usma.edu/the-caliphates-global-workforce-an-inside-look
TSG, ‘Foreign fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq’, NYC: The
Soufan Group, December 2015; ‘Preliminary Findings by the United Nations Working Group on the Use of
Mercenaries on its Official Visit to Tunisia,’ 8 July 2015, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEv-
ents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16219&LangID=E.
Counter-terrorism Judicial Pole spokesperson Sofien Selliti, ‘Nous ne pouvons pas refuser le retour des
éléments terroristes’, 11 May 2018, available at: http://www.lapresse.tn/component/nationals/?task=arti-
cle&id=147935
Aaron Y Zelin, ‘Tunisian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria’, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, PN55, 2018.
A Zelin, ‘The others: Foreign fighters in Libya’, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, PN45, 2018.
H Malka and M Balboni, ‘Tunisian Fighters in History and Today’, Washington DC: CSIS, June 2016. Available
at: http://foreignfighters.csis.org/tunisia/tunisian-fighters-in-history.html
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hting, training and smuggling activities and his extensive network. He founded
nsar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST), which became a major vehicle for recruiting and
cilitating the travel of Tunisians to Syria, through Libya and Turkey.
hile many of these fighters remain abroad, a significant number have returned to
eir home country. Official estimates place the number of Tunisian returnees at 800
 April 20177 and around a thousand by March 2018.8 However, no official informa-
on is available to the public about the timeframe of their return as they were
lowed to go and return freely during the 2012-14 period, as evidenced by the state-
ents of a number of convicted returnees in Tunisian prisons interviewed by this
thor.9
or is there documented information about the causes or motivations for their
turn or the whereabouts of those at large. The Rescue Association of Tunisians
apped Abroad estimates that between 400 and 500 Tunisians have entered
nisian territory undetected, mainly through the porous Tunisia-Libya borders.10
Chart 1: Returnees arrested in Tunisia36
e reluctance of the Tunisian authorities to disclose information on foreign terrorist
hters (FTFs) and returnees is due to strict regulations as well as concern about
blicly revealing sensitive intelligence on how the security services operate. There
 also concern that it could exacerbate the state of near-permanent political crisis in
e country given the role that the political parties and high-level officials have
ayed in supporting or facilitating this jihadi mobilisation in its early stages (see the
xt section).
Yasser Mosbah, Ministry of the Interior Spokesperson, 23 April 2017, available at: http://www.lapresse.tn/
component/nationals/?task=article&id=129832
Counter-terrorism Judicial Pole spokesperson Sofien Selliti.
Emna Ben Arab et al., Assessing the Threat Posed by Tunisian Foreign Fighters. Tunis: Tunisian Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2018.
urce: Emna Ben Arab et al., Assessing the Threat Posed by Tunisian Foreign Fighters. Tunis: Tunisian Institute for Stra-
gic Studies, 2018.
Sarah Souli, ‘Tunisia: Why Foreign Fighters Abandon ISIL’, Aljazeera, 3 March 2016, http://bit.ly/2RWM4GB
In
fr
ch
ch
co
pr
te
al
po
ba
w
Re
ar
m
fig
In
ar
re
se
Li
be
fa
le
dr
a 
G
ad
A
an
ex
th
w
ti
N
ea
ra
th
pa
Th
inCOMPARING POLICIES ON RETURNING FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS IN EGYPT, MOROCCO AND TUNISIA
 the absence of official documented information on the overall phenomenon, data
om a contextualised field study involving 82 detainees indicted on terrorism
arges with a final and irrevocable verdict conducted in 2017 will be used for this
apter. Among the detainees interviewed, 58 returned from hotbeds of armed
mbat (Syria, Iraq, Libya), while the others were either denied entry there or were
osecuted in Tunisian courts on charges related to membership of a clandestine
rrorist cell or the adoption, acclaim and advocacy of violent thought. The study
lowed the creation of a general demographic pattern of the Tunisian foreign fighter
pulation, identifying trends in radicalisation and recruitment and providing a
seline assessment of Tunisian foreign fighters’ motivations for going abroad to
age jihad.
sults from this survey show that the sample population is mostly young (over 55%
e aged between 20 and 29 years) and unmarried. Young people seem to be the
ajor group targeted by the rhetoric of terrorist organisations seeking to recruit
hters characterised by endurance, impulsiveness and instability.
 terms of gender, the survey data show that the phenomenon of departure for
eas of armed combat concerns males more than females due to the rules and
strictions imposed on the latter, especially in conservative communities, and their
condary role within most terrorist groups engaged in armed combat.
mited academic attainment is a recurring variable. Many have not graduated
yond primary school and more than 40% are secondary-school dropouts, and their
milies are similarly poorly educated. When questioned as to their reasons for
aving school, a plurality (25%) reported that academic failure spurred their
opout, another 4% claimed they were dismissed, while 14% regarded education as
‘useless process’ that could not in any way have brought them any added value.37
iven that the majority of the sample reported low educational attainment, a lack of
equate schooling seems to be a contributing factor to radicalisation.
nother important variable that has emerged from the study is precarious economic
d financial situations. Around 9% were unemployed at the time of involvement in
tremist activities. This rate is lower than the national unemployment rate. Never-
eless, they were generally either active in independent jobs (such as sole traders)
ith insecure and fluctuating incomes or involved in the informal sector. This situa-
on generates a certain economic stress but cannot be described as poverty.
early 78% of respondents have a monthly income (64 participants), of whom 25%
rn an income higher than 700 TND (around €220), and 22% have a monthly income
nging between 300 and 500 TND (€90-60), just above the minimum wage. No more
an 19.5% of respondents benefit from the social security system (16/82 partici-
nts), which is well below the national average (81% in 2011).
e combination of economic hardship and social exclusion is one of the most cited
justices by the participants who emphasised the absence of opportunities for living
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decent life and the lack of economic development in their localities. Most of them
cused on the hopes generated by the 2011 revolution and the high expectations
sociated with it, as well as the ensuing disappointment as a result of its failure to
hieve the promises of development and employment. Although there seems to be
correlation between deprived geographic locations and the high number of foreign
hters,11 it is worth noting that some interior governorates known for their low
cio-economic indicators and for being underserved for decades did not produce as
any foreign fighters as regions such as Grand Tunis or Bizerte, as can be seen in the
ble below based on our sample. This is also confirmed by data provided by Sterman
d Rosenblatt, who divided the country into four regions. The interior periphery
endouba, Béja, Kef, Siliana, Zaghouan, Kairouan, Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid and Gafsa)
oduced fighters at a rate of 3.8 fighters per 100,000 residents, and the eastern
astal region had a rate of 3.4 per 100,000 residents. In contrast, Grand Tunis
oduced fighters at a rate of 8.1 fighters per 100,000 residents followed by the
uthern border region at a rate of 6.3 per 100,000 residents.12
Chart 2: Number of FTF by governorate
overnorate Number of FTF
rand Tunisa 22
eja 1
ef 1
iliana 1
endouba 2
aghouan 4
izerte 6
abeul 3
ousse 438
David Sterman and Nate Rosenblatt, ‘All Jihad is Local: ISIS in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula’, Vol.
II, Washington DC: New America, April 2018.
onastir 3
ahdia 2
airouan 3
asserine 4
fax 4
idi Bouzid 10
ataouine 1
edenine 3
ozeur 1
afsa 2
ebili 5
otal 82
Tunis: 13, Ariana: 2, Ben Arous: 4, Mannouba: 3.
urce: Emna Ben Arab et al., Assessing the Threat Posed by Tunisian Foreign Fighters. Tunis: Tunisian Institute for Stra-
gic Studies, 2018
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is sense of economic insecurity along with its associated mood of mistrust and fear
em to be among the most important drivers that enticed youth into adopting
tremist ideas. In addition, the perceived existence of a systematic and intentional
clusionary policy led by the state to further marginalise them, incites them to
monstrate more proclivity for extremism.
e feeling of injustice is another statistically significant factor. Around 90% of the
spondents associate Tunisia, either totally or partially, with the image of ‘the
untry of injustice.’ Most of them expressed a confused and conflicted attitude
wards their country and voiced a sense of belonging characterised by uncertainty
d insubstantiality. Indeed, the link that exists between the foreign fighters and
eir homeland seems to be reduced to a set of communal bonds: family, friends and
ighbourhood.
is negative view of Tunisia is based essentially on a sense of disappointment and
e absence of opportunities with a particular emphasis on the abusive behaviour of
curity forces. There is a total fusion, bordering on confusion, between the
meland and the system/institutions/regime. The nature of this relationship
pends primarily on the quality of life and the availability of resources and oppor-
nities offered to the individual. This utilitarian view of the ‘homeland’ has helped,
pecially in crises, to gradually erode their sense of belonging.
e confrontational relationship with the state and its institutions is one of the
ofound reasons that stimulated their indoctrination by extremist ideology and
eir membership in fundamentalist and violent groups. The respondents declare
at their relationship with the state and its institutions prior to their commitment to
tremism was either non-existent or characterised by tension.
ost foreign fighters were at one time using drugs, alcohol or other illicit substances.39
ey generally started consuming illicit substances with friends at a very early age
e. teenagers). This seems to confirm research findings that link delinquency to
rror activities.
Chart 3: Delinquency among foreign fighters
urce: Emna Ben Arab et al., Assessing the Threat Posed by Tunisian Foreign Fighters. Tunis: Tunisian Institute for Stra-
gic Studies, 2018.
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oreover, we found that more than half of the respondents suffered at least once
om a depressive disorder or other trouble before and/or after radicalisation,
though disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorders are not documented
ong Tunisian foreign-fighter detainees.
uring focus group conversations, participants expressed a deeply rooted attach-
ent to Islam as a religion, an identity and a way of life, then to family by empha-
sing the amount of psychological backing and material support their families have
ovided them during their imprisonment period, despite their rejection by society
 large. For example, most interviewees reported having received regular family
sits. According to feedback from key stakeholders, foreign fighters receive perma-
nt and unconditional family support during their incarceration period. Visits are
gular and extensive (including parents, brothers, uncles, etc.). Therefore, the
mily, as the second strongest symbol of identity, represents their last resort and
timate hope in what they perceive as their incarceration ordeal.
owever, we observed that our respondents’ life trajectories prior to the phase of
tremism did not indicate a considerable degree of interpersonal harmony within
e family. Accordingly, the improvement of this relationship, which coincides with
e detainees’ custodial period, is an interesting indicator of some alarming potential
dicalisation of the foreign fighters’ social milieu, but at the same time evidence of
e significant role the family is capable of playing as a guardian of young people and
deterrent of violent extremism.
ur attempt to highlight a unique set of foreign-fighter attributes reveals the
sence of any unique identifier that would distinguish them from other individuals
ho chose to engage in intra muros terrorist activity. Their ‘pathways to radicaliza-
1340
on’ or ‘staircase to terrorism’  are determined by a general pattern that includes
 identity crisis, governance issues, social frustration, economic hardships and
ucation failures that have affected their choices.
hy Tunisia?
hile the preconditions described above (unemployment, poverty, bad governance,
c.) combined with populist pan-Islamism are common to many countries in the
gion, there are at least four factors that are specific to Tunisia and may explain the
precedented scope of departures to Libya, Iraq and Syria.
rst, Islamist-led governments between 2011-2013 provided a favourable political
imate for radicalisation by turning a blind eye towards indoctrination campaigns in
ils and mosques. During this period, mosques witnessed ‘occupy mosques’
Stefano M Torelli, Meroni Fabio and Francesco Cavatorta, ‘Salafism in Tunisia: Challenges and Opportuni-
ties for Democratization.’ Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, N°4, Winter 2012.
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mpaigns in which moderate imams were forced to step down and were replaced
 Salafi jihadist imams selected by Ansar al-Sharia, which was also given broad
eway, allowed to engage in dawa (religious proselytisation) and provide social
rvices to local communities. The ‘proselytising tents’ were set and run by political
rties (Ennahdha and Ethahrir) as a space for jihadists to hold meetings and
stribute flyers and booklets and became a major public recruitment channel for the
adists between mid-2011 and July 2013, when they were banned. A 30-year-old
terviewee in Douar Hisher claimed that three to four youngsters were recruited
ery day through the ‘proselytising tents’, and a 27-year-old member of the
ovement proudly argued that the tents were a Tunisian invention and Tunisians
ho answered the call for jihad took the concept with them to Syria.14
e interim governments’ public actions were in harmony with the general trend
wards mobilising youth to fight in Syria. They included the cessation of diplomatic
lations with the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad in February 2012, the convening
 the ‘Friends of Syria’ conference on 24 February 2012, and the reception by
terim Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki in the Presidential Palace of a number
 sheikhs and Islamic preachers who spoke about ‘the position of the nation’s
holars on the Syrian issue’ and glamourised jihad, which according to them,
tailed a duty to support Syria with human resources, funds and weapons. More
an 70 of these religious figures were welcomed to Tunisia by government officials
d party leaders (e.g. Rached Ghannouchi) and given plenty of opportunities to
ise awareness of what was happening in Syria and impact potential volunteers.
ccording to the 2015 Report of the National Observatory for consumer protection
EF), an unprecedented number of NGOs – 17,000 – were created in the post-2011
riod, 48% of which did not abide by their declared scope and objectives and 19%41
 which were operating as religious and charity organisations. Some of these NGOs
ere funded by unknown sources and operated as facilitators for arms and foreign-
hter smuggling and provided logistical support to religious figures who amplified
rratives of violent extremism.
is permissive post-revolutionary environment, dubbed as the ‘golden age’ by our
terviewees,15 was also echoed in the discourse of Rached Ghannouchi, the head of
ahdha Islamist party, who described terrorist activity in Mount Chaambi in the
estern part of Tunisia, where jihadis were known to be training, as young Salafis
ho were ‘holders of a new culture and [who] do not represent a threat to security,’
ying that they were ‘our sons who remind me of when I was their age’. He also sent
blic condolences for the ‘assassination’ of Osama Bin Laden to his family and the
lamic world.
J H Salem, Salafism Jihadism in Tunisia: current state and prospects: an ethnographic case study. Tunis:
Tunisian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2014.
Emna Ben Arab et al., Assessing the Threat Posed by Tunisian Foreign Fighters. Tunis: Tunisian Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2018
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e government’s role was confirmed by former US ambassador to Tunisia, Jacob
alles, who claims that the Troika government of 2012-2013 initially tolerated
adist activities by allowing Ansar al-Sharia and other radical groups to organise in
e open and send fighters to Syria.16 It was indeed between March 2013 and June
14, following the ban on AST and a crackdown on its members, that most Tunisians
ho had mobilised left for Iraq and Syria.17
e second factor was the 2011 post-uprising shake-up within the security
paratus, which led to the erosion of the security environment. One of the very first
cisions of the post-uprising government was the dissolution of the secret service
 March 2011, undermining domestic intelligence collection and information
aring. Besides, this corps d’élite was a target after the uprising and came under
tack for having propped up the previous regime for so long, which weakened their
orale and affected their performance.
ird, the general amnesty granted to prisoners in February 2011 resulted in the
lease of 2,000 alleged political prisoners of the Ben Ali regime. Among them were
0 individuals ‘trained militarily’ in foreign camps18 or with fighting experience in
fghanistan, Iraq or Algeria. These charismatic figures played a key role in the mobili-
tion of Tunisian FTFs.
nally, this situation was aggravated by the new opportunities created for foreign
hters in Libya, where an anarchic environment gave rise to greater freedom of
ovement, training and funding combined with the ready availability of weapons
hich proliferated in the lawless desert on the Tunisian-Libyan border, providing an
traordinary way for extremists to train new recruits on their way to Syria. Libya is
lieved to be the major training camp for Tunisian jihadists. According to all42
turnees interviewed by this author, they either trained in Libya or used Libya as a
ansit country towards Syria. According to another report, 70% of all Tunisians
rested for jihadi-related cases trained in Libya.19
he perception of foreign fighter returnees in Tunisia
reign fighters are perceived by Tunisian authorities and by the mainstream popula-
on as a potential threat to security with unprecedented lethality and capacity to
use mass destruction. Indeed, two of Tunisia’s deadliest terrorist attacks in recent
With Aaron Zelin, Jacob Walles addressed a policy forum at The Washington Institute as part of the Stein
Counterterrorism Lecture Series on 10 December 2018 on the mobilisation of Tunisian youth for jihad in
Syria. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/view/tunisias-foreign-fighters#
Aaron Y Zelin, ‘Tunisian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria’, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, PN55, 2018
Houssem Haddad, ةѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧلودلا عѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧم تاѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧھجاوملاو راѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧشتنلاا ..ةيѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧسنوتلا ةيفلѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧسلا, 2018 http://www.islamist-move-
ments.com/45486
A Zelin, ‘The others: Foreign fighters in Libya’, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, PN45, 2018.
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story, the March 2015 Bardo National Museum assault and the June 2015 mass
ooting on a beach in Sousse, were perpetrated by individuals previously trained in
byan camps. This exacerbated very real fears that attacks involving people with
reign training/experience are considerably deadlier than those planned by
megrown operatives (i.e. those who have never fought or trained abroad). The
asterminds of these two attacks were Moez Fezzani and Noureddine Chouchane,
o Tunisian foreign fighters and senior Islamic State (ISIS) members based in Libya.
e executive team of the Bardo attack were ISIS operatives Yassine Labidi and Jaber
chnaoui, who travelled to Libya, trained there and came back undetected with a
ission that led to the killing of 20 tourists and two Tunisians and the injuring of 50
hers. The Sousse massacre was an ISIS remote-controlled attack carried out by
ifeddine Rezgui Yacoubi, trained in Libya, which killed 38 and injured 39 at the Riu
perial Marhaba Hotel.
reign fighter returnees may also serve as force multipliers within domestic jihadist
tworks. For instance, returnees’ extensive knowledge of the local environment
as used in the Ben Guerden attacks for improved operational planning and logistics.
n 7 March 2016, ISIS militants attempted to conquer the Tunisian border town of
n Guerden by activating sleeper cells who were joined by ISIS operatives from
bya. The attack showed painstaking planning that combined an assault on security
rces with strategic communication with local residents to explain and justify their
esence. ‘Don’t worry. We are the Islamic State. We are here to protect you from
is non-believer government,’20 they were reported as saying on the city’s
udspeakers. Although the takeover of the town failed, it further strengthened the
nisians’ perception that foreign fighters’ activities surpass local terrorists in
ngerousness and lethality. For the first time, a foreign terrorist group had43
tempted to occupy Tunisian soil for the purpose of establishing a jihadi province.
turnees may also be effective recruiters, as their foreign experience has earned
em a degree of prestige among prison inmates, and street credibility within certain
rcles in their communities. Indeed, in conversations with key actors and active
akeholders in charge of running the daily life of detainees indicted on charges of
rrorism in penitentiary centres, foreign fighters were treated with reverence by
her inmates because of their battlefield knowledge and experience, we were told
 prison officials.21 It is no surprise that foreign fighter returnees who have fought
 conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia and elsewhere have gone on to become
ominent jihadist figures, such as Abu Iyadh Attounisi (see above) and formed the
rd core of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia after their release from jail in 2011.
Raouf Ben Hédi and Mohamed Garoui, ‘Les Terroristes Passent aux Aveux: Leur Plan pour Instaurer l’Émirat
de Ben Guerdène,’ Business News, 8 March 2016, http://washin.st/2e0EYPz.
Emna Ben Arab et al. Assessing the Threat Posed by Tunisian Foreign Fighters. Tunis: Tunisian Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2018
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is perception is reflected in the highly tense and intransigent debate that started
 2014, when the Tunisian government considered the establishment of a reintegra-
on programme for returnees through an amnesty programme which the Tunisia
terior ministry, described as ‘a forgiveness and repentance law … previously
acted in countries like Algeria and Italy,’ and that it will be applied to ‘[a]ny
nisian who does not have blood on his hands.’22 This initiative did not gain traction
d, instead, in November 2015, then Tunisian Foreign Minister Taieb Baccouch
plained that the government ‘would not accept a pardon for legal accounta-
lity.’23 The President of the Republic, finding himself at the heart of this controver-
al issue after declaring that the Tunisian constitution guarantees the right of return
 all Tunisians, had to backtrack a few days later and declare that a repentance law
r returnees was not an option.24 This position seems to enjoy the support of
nisian civil society organisations and unions.25
deed, in January 2017, a call was launched by Tunisian citizen groups to demon-
rate against the return of terrorists who fought in Syria, Libya or Iraq. The General
nion of Tunisian workers (UGTT), the major workers’ union in the country, also
clared its rejection of a repentance law for terrorists who, it argued, had to be
osecuted before Tunisian courts.
ese positions reflect the absence of a societal debate in relation to the reintegra-
on of foreign fighter returnees beyond their prosecution. To the arguments that not
l foreign fighters will seek to perpetrate violence when they return home because
 their disillusionment with the jihadist movement and may wish to reintegrate into
ainstream society, the shared position of the government and civil society position
 that Tunisia is not well equipped enough in terms of resources, know-how and
telligence to establish a typology of foreign fighter returnees and to develop44
rgeted policies to address the various returnee populations on a case-by-case
sis. Prison officials, during our interviews, pointed to the lack of expertise and
ancial resources to lead reintegration programmes for returnees in jails.
he Tunisian response to returnees
ith the return of such a large contingent of the Tunisian FTFs, Tunisia faces the
fficult challenge of developing a large-scale response beyond prosecution, while
cognising the singularity of individual cases.
A Zelin and J Prohov, ‘Proactive Measures: Countering the Returnee Threat,’ Lawfare, 18 May 2014.
S Souli, ‘Tunisia: Why Foreign Fighters Abandon ISIL,’ Al Jazeera, 3 March 2016.
‘L’UGTT se prononce contre la Loi du repentir et pour la poursuite judiciaire des terroristes!’, Business
News, 14 December 2016, available at: http://www.businessnews.com.tn/lugtt-se-prononce-contre-la-loi-
du-repentir-et-pour-la-poursuite-judiciaire-des-terroristes,520,68991,3
Yassine Bellamine, ‘Des citoyens appellent à manifester contre le retour de terroristes tunisiens en Tunisie’,
HuffPost, 13 December 2016, available at: http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2016/12/13/retour-jihad-
istes-tunisie_n_13599446.html?utm_hp_ref=tunisie
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 far, Tunisia’s approach to foreign fighter returnees has focused almost exclusively
 punitive measures. According to a Ministry of Interior spokesperson, 95% of
reign fighter returnees have either been arrested immediately upon arrival or
aced under surveillance.26 Some returnees are imprisoned for months without
ceiving a trial, while others are released after being interrogated for only a short
riod of time, suggesting that the government’s approach is sometimes arbitrary
d haphazard.27 Overall, only a minority of returnees, around 35%, are sentenced
 prison.28 Moreover, as stated above, a number of FTFs may have returned
detected and therefore remain outside the radar of the authorities.
nisia enacted a new counterterrorism law in July 2015, replacing the previous law
 2003, imposing more stringent punishments, including the death penalty for
nvicted terrorists. Terrorist acts covered by this law range from apologies for
rrorism in social media to conspiring, facilitating, financing, recruiting and
ecuting terrorist assaults in Tunisia and elsewhere. Many political leaders have
blicly called for returnees to be prosecuted to the full extent of this law, and
veral terrorists have already been sentenced to death since 2015.
 the repression-centric approach to returnees, prisons occupy a central stage.
owever, no disengagement or deradicalisation programmes are being offered. In
ct, from our prison observation and the data collected from detainees as well as
ison officials, the preparation for post-prison life, which is to start in prisons, is not
king place. Unlike common law prisoners who benefit from reinsertion
ogrammes inside the prisons (professional training, cultural enhancement activi-
es, etc.), foreign fighters and other terror-convicted inmates are subject to strict
curity measures, or even solitary confinement for those engaged in recruitment
tivities, which both prevent them from mingling with other convicts outside or45
cess tailored counselling or professional training programmes aimed at facilitating
eir reinsertion into society. Besides, overcrowded prisons and the absence of
aining programmes for penitentiary personnel to deal properly with returnees and
rrorist convicts in general are not helping with devising an overall strategy to disen-
ge, rehabilitate and reintegrate returnees. Jacob Walles, former US ambassador to
nisia, observed that ‘the country’s overcrowded prisons continue to serve as a
eeding ground for jihadists’.29
turnees are typically sentenced to five years in jail, followed by three to five years’
obation during which they are required to check in with local authorities on a
gular basis. All detainees expressed their concern about the probation period. They
aimed they would be subject to police harassment which may impact their ability
S Souli, ‘Tunisia: Why Foreign Fighters Abandon ISIL,’ Al Jazeera, 3 March 2016.
Ibid.
K Cragin, ‘Foreign Fighter “Hot Potato”‘, Lawfare, 26 November 2017.
A Zelin and J Walles, ‘Tunisia’s Foreign Fighters’, Policy Watch 3053, Wasgington DC: Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, 17 December 2018.
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 lead a normal life and could significantly increase their chances of recidivism and
 re-engaging in terrorist-related activities.
ke many countries in the region, imprisonment in Tunisia is considered to be the
d of the judicial process. This is not helpful in terms of proper monitoring of the
leased returnees who become absolutely free, unless under probation. Besides,
ce out of jail, information about them and their penitentiary history is not readily
ailable to the communities to which these individuals return. The moment the
tainees go out through the prison gate, the director of a prison in Tunis claimed,
l ties with them come to an end. Therefore, supporting disengagement and reinte-
ation programmes at the local community level becomes greatly hampered – if
ch programmes are even offered. The release of returnees in the coming two or
ree years will become a challenge in itself.
iven the magnitude of the foreign-fighter phenomenon, arresting or keeping all
reign fighters under surveillance upon their return is both an unfeasible and
effective use of resources, considering that not all returnees pose a threat.
milarly, reactive policies aimed at curbing foreign-fighter recruitment are unlikely
 address, and may even inflame, the core grievances that motivate Tunisian youth
 go abroad to join jihadist groups. Thus, there is a need for more comprehensive
rategies that incorporate socio-economic, political, religious, educational and
ltural measures to address both foreign fighter recruitment and the returnee
allenge.
r that purpose, the National Strategy for Counter Terrorism adopted by Tunisia’s
ational Security Council in 2016 announces a change in the strategic direction
eded to tackle the problem as it stipulates that fighting extremism and terrorism46
quires a multidimensional approach built around four main axes: prevention,
otection, judicial proceedings and retaliation.
ere appears to be a consensus that this security challenge requires addressing
multaneously the root causes of radicalisation and enhancing the capacity of
curity forces to anticipate and respond to the threat. However, while the security
rvices were reinforced accordingly, there has been no operational preventive
rategy in place so far to counter a growing jihadist threat that goes beyond security
 the narrowest sense. This lack of a preventive strategy is due to poor institutional
ordination, numerous administrative obstacles and the fragmentation of stake-
lders (the ministries and the multiple ad-hoc counter-terrorism commissions) and
sources. This is hampering the effective integration of the financial and technical
pport received by Tunisia – as part of its collaboration with regional and interna-
onal partners – into a clear strategic vision. Besides, prevention is closely inter-
ined with larger political and economic issues that are particularly difficult to
solve.
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hildren returnees
 addition to the security threat posed by returnees, a substantial number of
ildren who are reported to have been either taken to Syria and Libya or born there
ill seek to come back. It is estimated as of August 201830 that 83 children of Tunisian
nnection (one or both parents are Tunisian citizens) are stranded in Libya seeking
try permission to Tunisian soil.
hile this is not yet a topic of debate in Tunisia, the option of denying them entry is
ing entertained. There is clearly hesitation of how to deal with this thorny issue.
ese children who have likely been exposed to the ‘Caliphate’ ideology and
utality, will pose a serious challenge in terms of reintegration if they return and will
rse grudges against their community that could nurture their desire for revenge if
ey are not allowed to come back. So far there have been no mechanisms in place
 classify the children stranded along the Tunisian-Libyan borders (whether they are
ctims or a security threat having been exposed to ideological indoctrination and
ilitary training) to allow their entry to Tunisian soil, nor are tailored programmes in
ace to accompany them if they return.
onclusion
e jihadi mobilisation in Tunisia is unprecedented, as illustrated by the approxi-
ately 4,500 FTFs in Libya, Syria and Iraq, and the approximately 30,000 individuals
ho were prevented from travelling. Meanwhile, the ability of the authorities to
spond effectively to this challenge is in question. With no hard proof of deradical-
ation, which includes ‘renouncing ?violence? (behavioral de-radicalization) and de-
gitimizing ?extreme ideas? (ideological deradicalization)’31 and with no social,47
onomic and psychological support systems, returnees are likely to turn back to the
tremist community that had once attracted them.
ith the devolution of power to the local governments in its very early stages in
nisia, public security requires that the Tunisian government play a leading role in
itiating and overseeing reintegration programmes for foreign fighter returnees
ith close coordination with local communities who are in a position to provide them
ith multi-actor individualised support – including psychological counselling, profes-
onal training and religious orientation – and to rebuild trust between them and
eir government.
is requires an open societal debate about the status of the returnees (some go as
r as calling for revocations of nationality, others push for adopting a differentiated
proach though there is no system in place to classify returnees) and pursuing
The Rescue Association of Tunisians Trapped Abroad, conference 12/8/2018 https://en.ratta-tn.org/
O Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists. London: Routledge, 2009.
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forts to mitigate underlying conditions that facilitate radicalisation and recidivism.
dire socio-economic conditions are reversed and the identity crisis is addressed,
tremist ideas’ appeal and potency will wither away.48
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TIHADI VETERANS IN THE MAGHREB: LESSONS FROM 
HE PAST AND CHALLENGES FOR TOMORROW
HOMAS RENARD
e Maghreb has a long history of jihadi activism. Yet, even by regional standards,
e mobilisation of fighters to wage jihad in Libya, Syria and Iraq was impressive. For
nisia and Morocco, the magnitude of this phenomenon was unprecedented. The
ntingent of jihadi volunteers from the three countries covered in this report
gypt, Morocco and Tunisia) is larger than the number of foreign terrorist fighters
TFs) from the entire European Union (EU), and possibly larger than the North
frican contingent that fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. This
sue has raised concern among North African countries. Contributions to this report
ghlight the difficulties and limitations of local approaches to dealing with
turnees. Beyond North Africa, Europeans are worried about the lasting destabi-
ing effect of these veteran fighters in the region. Hence they monitor the situation
ith particular attention while enquiring how they can support local efforts.
Figure 1: Estimates of (returning) foreign fighters from North Africa
FTF in Syria/Iraq (est.) FTF in Libya (est.) Returnees (est.)
gypt 500-600 112 n/a
orocco 1,664 300 213
unisia 3,000 1,500 1,000
otal 5,164-5,264 1,912 1,213+49
eturnees from the past
e jihadi threat is severe in the Maghreb but it is not new. Egypt, Morocco and
nisia have previously been confronted by jihadi mobilisations. Hundreds of
nisians and about 2,000 Egyptians fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union
 the 1980s. While few Moroccans joined the anti-Soviet jihad, there were several
ndred fighting in Iraq in the early 2000s. The magnitude of mobilisations has thus
ried over time and across countries but it remained a recurring phenomenon in the
gion.
orth African authorities do not ignore the risks associated with returning foreign
hters. Some of the veteran ‘Arab Afghans’ were directly involved in violent activi-
es upon their return. Some Egyptians were involved in destabilising activities as well
 assassination attempts against local leaders. Hosni Mubarak narrowly escaped
me assassination attempts by veteran jihadis in the 1990s. In Morocco, Afghan
Total Libya/Syria/Iraq: 7,076-7,176
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terans were involved in the deadly Casablanca attacks of 2003, which killed 33 and
jured many more. In Tunisia, the 2002 attack on a synagogue in Djerba, which killed
, was conducted by Nizar Bin Muhammad Nasar Nawar (Sayf al-Din al-Tunisi), a
ung Tunisian from Ben Guerdane who had trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghani-
an in the late 1990s.1
 number of returnees also remained involved in militant activities upon their return.
ot all of them supported violence, but a small group certainly played a key role in
porting’ the jihadi ideology and tactics. It was, for instance, veterans of Afghani-
an and Chechnya who, in 2000, established the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)
sociated with al-Qaeda and Ansar al-sharia in Tunisia in 2011. It was a veteran from
fghanistan who established the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (MICG) – also
sociated with al-Qaeda.
 number of veteran fighters tried to return home and live a normal life.2 However,
is was rarely tolerated by local regimes. Many veterans then turned into fugitives.
s regimes in Tunisia, Egypt or Algeria were not always particularly comfortable with
ese jihadis wandering freely around, they sought to repatriate some of them
rough extradition agreements with Pakistan.3 Some returned and were sent to
ison or executed. Others were killed while waging jihad. Overall, veteran fighters
ere perceived as a threat and indeed acted accordingly. They were troublemakers
d disrupters who had acquired military experience and skills in combat, who
rned into radical militants of jihad and were well-networked internationally.4
ot all ‘Arab Afghans’ returned home. At least, not immediately. Some continued the
ad elsewhere, in Chechnya and Bosnia notably. Others were involved in interna-
onal plots abroad. This was notably the case of one of the 1993 World Trade Center50
mbing perpetrators, Egyptian veteran fighter Mahmud Abouhalima. The failed
tack killed six and injured over a thousand New Yorkers. A string of bloody attacks
rgeted countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan at home and abroad.
ther returnees encouraged militant activities in their home countries from abroad,
cluding violent actions, sometimes while still based in Afghanistan or Pakistan.5
me also reached senior positions within al-Qaeda. This is notably the case for the
yptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, who became the leader of al-Qaeda following Osama
n Laden’s death. According to some sources, it was within the Egyptian contingent
 mujahedeen that the ambition of launching a global jihad to overthrow Arab
A Zelin (2017), ‘Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing’, CTC Sentinel, 10:4.
M Hafez (2008), ‘Jihad after Iraq: Lessons from the Arab Afghans Phenomenon’, CTC Sentinel, 1:4.
‘Arab veterans of Afghanistan war lead new Islamic Holy War’, Compass, 28 October 1994. Available at:
https://fas.org/irp/news/1994/afghan_war_vetrans.html
D Byman (2015) ‘The homecomings: what happens when Arab foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria return?’,
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 38:8, pp. 581-602.
‘The writer traveled the Afghan-Pakistani border region to learn what Islamic radicals want and how they
hope to achieve it’, Associated Press, 20 November 1993. Available at: https://www.apnews.com/
183bb25a227f2a416589849813eddeae
re
da
N
ve
th
‘b
th
20
a 
le
H
Tu
jih
su
ex
th
W
Be
on
nu
w
de
ca
no
th
ad
Fi
ac
or
un
an
of
st
ev
of
6
7
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gimes emerged.6 Even from abroad, some of these veterans remained a formi-
ble threat to their countries of origin.
orth African countries are thus well aware of the negative fallout of (returning)
teran fighters, more so than any other country. They experienced it throughout
e 1990s and 2000s – Morocco perhaps less than Tunisia and Egypt. The term
lowback’ was already in use among intelligence services in the 1990s to describe
is very phenomenon,7 also referred to as the ‘veteran effect’ today. Following the
03 war in Iraq and the 2011 Syrian conflict, some of these ‘veteran fighters’ played
significant role in recruitment, or at least as a reference point for would-be travel-
rs.8 This is certainly the case in Tunisia where veterans like Seifallah Ben Omar Ben
assine, known as Abu Ayyad al-Tunisi, founded the TCG and later Ansar al-Sharia in
nisia, two organisations that offered huge support for mobilisation and travel to
adi theatres. In Morocco and Egypt, some individuals ensured continuity between
ccessive mobilisations. Yet, surprisingly, in spite of their awareness and own
perience with this threat, these countries have not devised specific responses to
e latest wave of jihadi travels.
hy they left
fore looking into the policies for coping with returnees, it is interesting to reflect
 some of the causes of the latest jihadi mobilisation. Why did an unprecedented
mber of Moroccans and Tunisians (and, to a lesser extent, Egyptians) decide to
age jihad in Libya, Syria and Iraq? All the countries in the region share certain
mographic and socio-economic characteristics, mainly the presence of a signifi-
nt youth and urban population whose social, economic or political aspirations are51
t met. This provides fertile ground for radicalisation and mobilisation. However,
is fertile ground would not have led to a massive mobilisation if it were not for
ditional factors that created the conducive environment.
rst, the ‘Arab Spring’ clearly contributed to the spreading of revolutionary ideas
ross North Africa. This created space for liberal movements as well as for well-
ganised Islamist groups. Certain movements and discourses that had been banned
der authoritarian regimes and survived clandestinely could emerge into the light
d become mainstream in a revolutionary environment. Furthermore, the presence
 an established Islamist scene, including some veteran jihadi fighters, provided a
and-by force ready to adapt and act quickly when domestic and global contexts
olved. When the opportunity for new jihadi mobilisation presented itself in a time
 domestic turmoil, these networks could quickly organise themselves.
S Engelberg, ‘One Man and a Global Web of Violence’, New York Times, 14 January 2001. Available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/14/world/one-man-and-a-global-web-of-violence-91343441510.html
M A Weaver (1996) ‘Blowback’, The Atlantic, May Issue.
Byman, op cit.
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cond, the fall of authoritarian regimes had a major impact on local mobilisation.
n the one hand, large numbers of Islamist militants, including convicted terrorists,
ere released from jail. On the other hand, the traditionally very strong security
rvices of these countries were deeply weakened, even disbanded in the case of
nisia, and were therefore unable to monitor jihadi recruiters and released terror-
ts, let alone prevent them from travelling.
ird, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt were each members of the ‘Friends of Syria
roup’, a diplomatic initiative designed to support the Syrian population and opposi-
on groups. Tunisia and Morocco both hosted meetings of this group in 2012. As
inted out by the authors in this report, this diplomatic support combined with calls
om prominent religious voices to support the Sunni population in Syria might have
en interpreted by some youngsters as a call for action or, at least, could easily be
strumentalised by jihadi recruiters. In Tunisia, the Islamist governments between
11-13 went even further by creating a permissive environment for jihadi ideology
d discourse, which may partly explain the particularly large contingent from that
untry.
nally, it is worth noting that the bulk of journeys to Syria and Iraq did not occur in
e immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring. While the jihadi mobilisation started as
rly as 2011, most journeys occurred only from 2013 onwards. The post-revolu-
onary permissive environment created hopes and enthusiasm domestically, and it
as only following a general disillusionment with the political transition and the
suing crackdown on Islamist movements that jihadi travelling increased. Around
13, the domestic space for contestation was narrowing while, at the same time,
me jihadi groups were increasingly attractive due to their military and political
cendance in nearby Libya and the Levant. As the tide was turning at home, young52
lunteers flocked to the ranks of ISIS and al-Qaeda. The mobilisation might have
en even more important in the absence of reaction from the authorities. Tunisia,
r instance, claims to have prevented 27,000 citizens from travelling abroad to wage
ad, although it is unclear where this figure comes from, and what measure(s)
ecifically made this possible.
hen they return
turning foreign fighters pose a serious challenge to all countries. Egypt and Tunisia
ve both been struck by terrorist attacks either perpetrated by or involving
turnees from Syria and Libya over the past few years. In this volume, Allison
cManus refers to several attacks in Egypt in which some of the plotters received
ilitary training in Syria or Libya. In Tunisia, two of the deadliest attacks in the
untry’s history (the 2015 attacks on the Bardo Museum and on a beach of Sousse,
lling 22 and 38 respectively) were committed by young Tunisians trained militarily
 neighbouring Libya. Strikingly, in both Egypt and Tunisia, it is not necessarily
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turnees from Syria and Iraq that appear to pose the most immediate threat, but
ther those who benefited from ungoverned areas in Libya or Sinai. This said, with
significant contingent of returnees, and possibly more to come following the fall of
e ‘Caliphate’, caution is in order.
f course, not all returnees constitute a threat. In fact, history dictates that only a
action of them will import the jihad to their homeland. Yet the threat of returning
hters goes beyond the direct risk of attacks. As discussed above, ‘veterans’ can
main involved in non-violent activities for years and decades, spreading the
eology and building networks to become a destabilising force at home. They can
so facilitate the next jihadi mobilisation, when the context is ripe.
e scope of the challenge varies from one country to another, as well as the capacity
 tackle it effectively. Tunisia would be confronted by about 1,000 returnees (repre-
nting about a third of its FTF contingent, similar to European ratios), while Morocco
ould only have just over 200 returnees (about 12% of its FTF contingent). Figures
r Egypt are unknown but most likely comprise between one hundred and several
ndred.
orth African countries have all taken some measures to deal with the increased
rrorist threat. However, these responses are all mostly security-driven, thus failing
 take a comprehensive approach. Morocco is the only one of the three countries
udied in this report to adopt a systematic approach. ‘Every ISIS returnee who sets
ot in Morocco will be arrested, questioned, and sent to the courts,’ said the head
 Rabat’s intelligence services in December 2018.9 Indeed, according to Kathya
rrada in this volume, all returnees have been tried and now sit in jail. Morocco is
 far the best-prepared country in the region. It has strong security services that53
ere further reinforced in recent years; it has adopted new laws to ease the prose-
tion of foreign fighters; and it has developed prison rehabilitation programmes
at are being scrutinised by other countries. Morocco is also very active in interna-
onal forums such as the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), sharing experi-
ces with other European, African and Asian countries. Furthermore, in contrast to
ost countries, including in Europe, Morocco seems sufficiently confident in its own
stitutions to repatriate some of its foreign fighters detained by Kurdish forces in
ria.10
mpared to Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have taken a narrower and less systematic
proach to dealing with returnees. In this volume, Emna Ben Arab raises doubts
out the ability of the Tunisian authorities to identify, prosecute and monitor
turnees. In spite of the strengthening of the security services and the adoption of
‘Prospect of ISIS Fighters Returning Rings Alarm Bells in Morocco’, Morocco World News, 31 December
2018. Available at: https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/12/262082/isis-fighters-morocco/
‘Morocco repatriates eight alleged jihadists from Syria’, Agence France Presse, 10 March 2019. Available at:
https://www.france24.com/en/20190310-morocco-repatriates-eight-alleged-jihadists-syria
ne
th
ad
th
re
or
pr
re
lo
th
m
th
co
W
ve
ti
in
pr
ta
se
se
ov
su
T
Co
of
ca
re
is
on
jih
an
in
to
nu
11
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w laws, the willingness and resources to cope with the return of more than a
ousand fighters seem insufficient.11 Security services, courts and the penitentiary
ministration are overwhelmed. Tunisian authorities and civil society seem to agree
at the country is ill-equipped to deal with this challenge. Only a fraction of
turnees were prosecuted and jailed, while most are said to be ‘under house arrest’
 ‘monitored’, if at all.12 Prisons lack specific rehabilitation and reinsertion
ogrammes for returnees. Due to stringent security measures by penitentiary staff,
turnees have basically no access to reinsertion programmes, which therefore
wers their chances of successful reinsertion. There are also concerns with regard to
e ability of the country not only to deradicalise or disengage these individuals, but
ore fundamentally to contain radicalisation in largely overcrowded prisons. Once
e FTFs are released from prison, there do not seem to be many plans to monitor or
unsel them either, while larger prevention programmes are mostly non-existent.
ith regard to Egypt, Allison McManus explains in this volume that there are simply
ry few specific instruments or laws for coping with returnees, in spite of a realisa-
on of the threat they pose. The penal code was adapted in 2015 but it remains
sufficient. The lack of transparency on the number of FTFs and returnees is a
oblem in itself, as it prevents international partners (notably the EU) from offering
ilored support. In the absence of transparency, it is not clear whether the security
rvices are up to the task. But a security-only approach is sure to fail, as there do not
em to be any deradicalisation or prevention programmes in place. Prisons are
ercrowded and allegedly fuelling radicalisation and therefore do not offer a
stainable solution to the challenge.
he European connection54
ncerns over returning foreign fighters are not specific to the Maghreb. The fall-out
 the Caliphate presents a global challenge with transnational and regional ramifi-
tions. The success or failure of North African countries to mitigate the threat from
turnees over the long term will have clear effects on security in Europe. First, there
, of course, the geographic proximity. Instability on the borders of Europe is in no
e’s interest. The development of jihadi networks or, worse, the strengthening of a
adi front closer to Europe is a worrying perspective. As the Caliphate has fallen,
d ISIS lost its last pockets of territory, there is the possibility of a jihadi resurgence
 other regions such as Libya or the Sinai. Some European FTFs could also manage
 make their way into these areas from Syria, although most likely in very limited
mbers.
‘Tunisia overwhelmed, divided over returning extremists’, Associated Press, 24 February 2017. Available at:
https://www.apnews.com/b9b54744173746beb1e07502904ec56f
‘Tunisia overwhelmed, divided over returning extremists’, op. cit.
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cond, there are historical and personal ties between North Africa and diaspora
mmunities in Europe. Many European foreign fighters who joined Syria and Iraq
ere of Moroccan or Tunisian descent. Many North African and European fighters
ught side by side, and some were integrated in the same units.13 Some Europeans
so travelled to and stayed in North Africa before heading to Syria.14 These ties have
evitably deepened in the Syrian context.
ch connections are not new. They have existed between jihadis from North Africa
d Europe for more than two decades: groups such as the MICG or the TCG were
rtly rooted in Europe in the 1990s. Historically, veteran fighters from the Maghreb
ve been active throughout Europe. Although European authorities are undoubt-
ly more vigilant today than in the 1990s, this should serve as a reminder that jihadi
tworks easily span the Mediterranean Sea.
st but not least, a number of European countries have stripped terrorist convicts
 suspects of their European citizenship and subsequently expelled them. This
proach is one of the cornerstones of Italy’s counter-terrorism policy, which has
pelled (with or without citizenship stripping) 362 presumed ‘extremists’ since
14. The vast majority of these expulsions concerned Moroccans, Tunisians and
yptians.15 It has also become a systematic practice in Germany, and is used with
creased frequency throughout Europe, mostly concerning binationals from North
frican countries.16 While intelligence services recognise that removing highly influ-
tial individuals from their environment may have a positive impact on local radical-
ation dynamics, the generalisation of this measure is not an effective long-term
licy.17 The more frequent use of expulsions will only further increase the burden
 North African countries, which are already facing a higher burden than Europe.18
oreover, such measures risk creating a new jihadi community of the ‘unwanted’,55
hich may further coalesce in prisons and socialise with local jihadi milieus. This
ommunity’ will not only hold deeper grievances against European authorities but
so rely on extensive networks in Europe, among friends and family, while being
ostly out of reach of European security services.
For instance, Amine Boutahar was a Moroccan citizen who was part of ISIS counter-intelligence unit along-
side several European fighters. See: ‘L’histoire d’un Maroco-néerlandais, fils d’un consul du Maroc, aux
services de Daech’, Yabiladi, 26 November 2018. Available at: https://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/
71408/l-histoire-d-un-maroco-neerlandais-fils-d-un.html
That was notably the case of Boubakeur el-Hakim, who travelled from France to Tunisia before going to
Syria. See: M Suc (2018), Les Espions de la Terreur, Paris: HarperCollins, p. 103.
M Olimpio, ‘The measure of expulsions for extremism’, Commentary, Milan: Italian Institute for Interna-
tional Political Studies (ISPI), 14 December 2018.
C Paulussen, ‘Countering Terrorism Through the Stripping of Citizenship: Ineffective and Counterproduc-
tive’, Perspective, The Hague: ICCT, 17 October 2018; G Chazan, ‘Germany to strip dual-nationals who fight
for Isis of citizenship’, Financial Times, 4 March 2019. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/1c929f90-
3e6b-11e9-9bee-efab61506f44
C Paulussen, op. cit.
K Cragin, ‘Foreign Fighter “Hot Potato”‘, Lawfare, 26 November 2017.
TBa
de
co
Co
m
In
co
Se
pr
fa
Th
ti
in
th
ti
Se
ni
re
ti
he
ar
sh
in
Th
de
m
ev
M
sp
ta
fig
th
cl
an
19COMPARING POLICIES ON RETURNING FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS IN EGYPT, MOROCCO AND TUNISIA
he way forward
sed on the findings of this report, it is evident that there is a need and space to
velop better policies to deal with returnees. In their efforts, North African
untries can take inspiration notably from the United Nations’ Counter-Terrorism
mmittee (UN CTC) ‘Madrid Guiding Principles’, which make very specific recom-
endations for coping with FTFs and returnees.19
 line with these principles, this report concludes that a more systematic and
mprehensive approach is needed to deal with returning fighters and their families.
curity measures are important to identify, monitor and prosecute returnees
operly. However, policies based exclusively on security measures will inevitably
il.
e penitentiary approach to returnees should be reconsidered. Firstly, radicalisa-
on in prison is a major challenge in many countries, but it seems particularly acute
 some of the countries studied in this report. Returnees will only add pressure to
is existing challenge. It is therefore crucial to develop policies that respond effec-
vely to the problem.
cond, jailing terrorists might be the end of the judicial cycle but it is only the begin-
ng of the rehabilitation and reintegration process. Such programmes started
cently in Morocco but are still absent in Egypt and Tunisia. Incarceration may effec-
vely ‘freeze’ the problem stemming from returnees for several years, but it will not
lp in the longer term as terrorists will be released sooner or later. Some returnees
e already exiting prisons in the Maghreb. An effective approach to returnees
ould therefore aim at lowering the chances of re-offending upon release by
creasing the chances of a successful reinsertion.56
is requires tailored programmes in prison but also more continuity between
tention and post-detention measures and administrations. Extensive cooperation
ust be encouraged between security and social services – a process that is far from
ident in Europe and does not seem to be envisaged yet in North Africa.
ore broadly, it is accepted that there is a need to broaden the counter-terrorism
ectrum, to invest more in community-based prevention programmes and in
ckling the environment that is conducive to radicalisation. Indeed, as foreign
hters return into society, the risk of them re-engaging in jihadi activities is high if
e primary causes of their radicalisation are not addressed. So far, however, it is not
ear how much effort has been invested in such prevention programmes. The
swer is clearly not enough.
Madrid Guiding Principles: A practical tool for Member States to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters,
UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, S/2015/939, December 2015; 2018 Addendum to the 2015 Madrid Guid-
ing Principles, UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, S/2018/1177, December 2018.
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rope is willing to share its own expertise and offer support to North African
untries, as emphasised by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in the foreword
 this report. This cooperation can be articulated specifically around counter-
rrorism issues. In this regard, more cooperation between judiciary and security
rvices can be beneficial to both European and North African countries. Coopera-
on between Moroccan and European intelligence services has increased, for
stance, as well as cooperation among prosecutors, notably in the context of the
artet between Moroccan, Belgian, French and Spanish prosecutors’ offices.
pacity-building programmes, such as the ones in Tunisia, should also be continued.
rthermore, European authorities can share their experience with the development
 a comprehensive approach to violent extremism, ranging from a robust ‘preven-
on’ pillar to rehabilitation and reinsertion programmes for terrorist convicts. While
ropean countries are still learning by doing, some lessons can already be drawn
om the past six years of experiments. In return, Europeans could also learn from
gional initiatives, notably from Morocco’s deradicalisation programmes in prison.
nally, at a broader level, Europeans should encourage and support initiatives that
m to tackle the North African environment that has proved conducive to radicalisa-
on. Supporting socio-economic development, education, rule of law, good govern-
ce and, most importantly, inclusive policies or regional integration could all serve
rrower counter-terrorism efforts.
 short, to conclude, there is still work ahead. The foreign fighters’ challenge will not
 away with the fall of the Caliphate. In fact, it may even increase with the return or
igration of a number of ‘Syrian veterans’. Historical precedents dictate tackling this
sue seriously and proactively. It is, of course, primarily each country’s responsibility57
 deal with its own returnees. Since radicalisation and mobilisation dynamics are
oted locally and differ across countries, there cannot be a one-size-fits-all
proach. However, in light of the scope of this challenge, and of its global dimen-
on, international cooperation is highly desirable. Every country would gain from an
en discussion of this challenge and the sharing of good practices. If jihadis of the
orld can unite, so should we.
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